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Abstract
Pigovian transport pricing was implemented in a large-scale field experiment
in urban areas of Switzerland. The pricing varied across time, space and mode of
transport. One third of the participants were given a financial incentive to reduce
their external costs of transport, whereas others were provided information only or
served as a control group. The pricing treatment caused a significant reduction in
the external costs of transport. This reduction is a consequence of mode substitution
and a shift of departure times. The effect of providing information in the absence
of pricing was statistically significant only for subgroups of the sample.
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1 Introduction
Transport systems face multiple challenges. In many cities around the world, drivers lose
over 100 hours per year due to traffic congestion (INRIX, 2020). Public transport can
help reduce congestion (Anderson, 2014) but also faces crowding problems. Increasing the
capacity of private and public transport faces physical limitations and can be very costly
as transport infrastructure competes with other land uses. Furthermore, greater road
capacity induces demand and thus results in little improvement in congestion (Duranton
and Turner, 2011). The transport sector is also among the largest contributors of local
air pollution (EEA, 2019) and greenhouse gas emissions (Creutzig et al., 2015), which
have remained roughly constant during the past 30 years as gains in efficiency have been
neutralized by an increase in distance traveled (IEA, 2020).
Congestion, climate damages and health effects constitute the most important external
costs of transport. Whereas the private costs of transport, such as the purchase of fuel or a
transport pass, have been shown to influence individual transport choices (Oum, Waters
and Yong, 1992; Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly, 2004; Vrtic et al., 2008), the external
costs are borne by society at large and are thus typically not reflected in the decision
about where, when and how to travel.1 This large-scale market failure is the normative
motivation for policy interventions in the transport domain. In this paper, we implement
a multi-modal Pigovian transport pricing scheme based on the full marginal social costs
of transport and estimate its effects on individual transport choices.
Our study uses the design of a randomized controlled trial (RCT). The sample consists
of people living in urban areas of the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland.
The pricing affects all modes and is implemented by providing the participants with a
budget, from which the external costs of their transport choices is subtracted. This
treatment causes a reduction in the external costs of transport by around 5.1%. If we
relate this to the (total) price increase implied by the Pigovian pricing scheme of 16.4%,
we arrive at an elasticity of -0.31. The reduction in the external costs is caused by a
combination of a shift in transport mode and departure times, but not a reduction in
the overall distance traveled. Women and French speakers respond less strongly to the
pricing. Moreover, the strength of the effect is driven by intrinsic values (as measured
using a standardized questionnaire), the extent to which people paid attention to the
experiment and/or had prior knowledge about the external costs of transport.
1The third category of transportation costs are the infrastructure costs, which are fixed and can be
paid by user fees or general subsidies. For a recent discussion of the definition of the external costs of
transport, see CE Delft (2019).
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To differentiate the pricing effect from a pure information effect, the experiment in-
cludes a second treatment in which the participants are provided with the same informa-
tion about the external costs of transport as the pricing group, but without having to pay
anything. The results suggest an effect of information per se, but this effect was smaller
than that of the pricing treatment and statistically significant at conventional levels only
for subgroups of the sample. The results further imply that adding pricing to information
is particularly important in reducing the external costs associated with congestion.
The external costs of transport have been, for the most part, addressed by “command-
and-control” policies such as speed limits (Van Benthem, 2015), fuel standards (Portney
et al., 2003), license-plate restrictions (Davis, 2017) or high occupancy lanes (Bento et al.,
2014). Theoretically speaking, however, price instruments reflecting the external costs of
transport are a more efficient means of regulation as they allow people to retain high-utility
trips while reducing those that they view as less important. The most prevalent examples
of price-based instruments in the transport sector are fuel taxes, road tolls and registration
fees. However, they are usually imposed to recover the cost of road construction and thus
typically do not reflect the full external costs of transport (Parry and Small, 2005; Parry,
Walls and Harrington, 2007). Road congestion charges can act as an effective way to
internalize some of the external costs of driving (Small, 2008), and several cities have
introduced fees for driving into the city center at certain times. However, these fees tend
to be fixed and can therefore not fully address the time-varying nature of congestion.
The theoretical foundations for road pricing were laid by Pigou (1920) and Knight
(1924). Vickrey (1963) showed that with optimal congestion pricing, tolls must match
the severity of congestion, and vary by time of day, location, type of vehicle and current
conditions. The methods for road pricing can be categorized by their level of internalizing
the external costs. In first-best pricing, the marginal external cost is charged to the
user. In this case, both the charging mechanism and the amount charged need to be
optimal Verhoef (2000). In second-best, the pricing mechanism is guided by the principle
of marginal external costs, but the implemented scheme is simplified (Small, Verhoef and
Lindsey, 2007). For a review of studies that applied economic incentives in the transport
context, see Dixit et al. (2017).
Previous empirical research includes computations of the aggregate effects of the con-
gestion charges that were introduced in Singapore (Agarwal and Koo, 2016), London
(Leape, 2006), Stockholm (Eliasson et al., 2009) and Gothenburg (Börjesson and Kristof-
fersson, 2018). Field experiments in Denmark and Australia installed GPS receivers in
vehicles and drivers were then exposed to different peak and off-peak pricing schemes
(Nielsen, 2004; Martin and Thornton, 2017). Commuters in Singapore responded to re-
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wards and social comparisons by shifting departure times when using public transit (Plun-
tke and Prabhakar, 2013), and quasi-experimental evidence of the congestion charges in
Norway suggests that that they were effective in reducing congestion and air pollution
(Isaksen and Johansen, 2021). There are two other RCT’s involving financial incentives
that we are aware of. One is by Rosenfield, Attanucci and Zhao (2020), who carry out
an experiment involving 2,000 employees at the Massachussetts Institute of Technology.
They use three treatment arms, but none of them led to statistically significant effects.
The other is by Kreindler (2018), who examines the effect of a departure time charge and
a zonal price on drivers in Bangalore and derives highly significant treatment effects using
a smartphone app similar to ours.
Most existing studies focused on a single mode of transport and could therefore not
identify modal shifts. To detect the full impact of transport pricing, observation (and
ideally pricing) of all modes is necessary, including of non-motorized modes (Tirachini
and Hensher, 2012) An example of a previous multi-modal study is the “Spitsmijden”
experiment in the Netherlands, in which commuters responded to financial and in-kind
rewards by shifting departure times, switching to other modes of transport and by working
from home (Ben-Elia and Ettema, 2011). Their monetary rewards were comparable to
the average external cost in our experiment. Our study is similar in spirit but based on a
larger sample and, importantly, uses a control group to absorb time-varying factors that
may be correlated with the treatment. This makes MOBIS, to the best of our knowledge,
the first multi-modal RCT of a pricing intervention in the transport context.
Because of concerns of social acceptability, behavioral change could also be achieved
by means of non-financial interventions, which could be easier to implement than prices
or taxes. A number of studies have investigated the effect of non-financial interventions in
the transport sector Möser and Bamberg (for a review, see 2008), and some recent papers
have used tracking apps to test the effect of informational interventions but based on small
samples (Maerivoet et al., 2012; Carreras et al., 2012; Bothos et al., 2014; Jariyasunant
et al., 2015). Among the few information-based RCTs carried out in the transport context
are Cellina et al. (2019) and (Kristal and Whillans, 2020), both of which did not find any
effects of non-financial incentives.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature of transport economics. First,
we provide a methodology to compute the marginal external costs of transport as they
vary across time and space and apply it to a sample observed in real time. This al-
lows for the computation of a multi-modal Pigovian pricing scheme, which provides a
useful benchmark for simplified versions of transport pricing. Second, by implementing
this pricing scheme in a representative sample of the population living in large urban ag-
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glomerations, we obtain credible information about the short-run behavioral response to
multi-modal transport pricing, including modal substitution. Third, because we apply an
information-only treatment within the same experiment, our experiment thus contributes
to our understanding of the relative importance of information-based and monetary in-
centives in the transport domain.
The next sections provide more background about the experimental setup and the
methodology used to compute the external costs of transport. Section 4 describes the
methodology, section 5 contains the results, and section 6 concludes.
2 The MOBIS experiment
2.1 Study design
The sample for the Mobility in Switzerland (MOBIS) project was recruited from indi-
viduals living in urban areas in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland.
Participants had to fulfill a number of inclusion criteria such as being between 18 and 65
years old and using a car at least two days per week. They agreed to having their daily
travel tracked with a smartphone app (see below) over a period of 8 weeks. In return for
taking part in the study, all participants were offered CHF 100, which they received at
the end of the project.2 The participants in the pricing treatment had the opportunity to
earn additional money by not spending all of their budget.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the study design. We contacted over 90,000 people by
mail and invited them to participate in the study. The addresses were randomly selected
and provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, which maintains a comprehensive registry
of inhabitants, and also from a private vendor.3 The first step consisted in an initial online
survey, which was filled in by 21,800 respondents. It contained questions about travel
behavior and socio-demographics and served as a screening mechanism. Around 11,000
of the respondents from the initial survey qualified for the tracking study, and 5,466
registered for it. However, not everyone who registered actually started tracking, and
some participants dropped out at the beginning of the study. A total of 3,656 participants
successfully completed the RCT. The MOBIS sample differs from the general population
due to an age restriction and the focus on drivers but is otherwise quite representative.
2At the end of the RCT (December 2020), one Swiss Franc (CHF) corresponded to 0.91 Euro or
1.11 US Dollars.
3We were provided with 60,000 addresses from the Federal Office of Statistics at no charge. When
it became clear that this would not be sufficient to recruit the required number of participants, we
purchased another 31,000 addresses from a private marketing firm.
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Figure 1: Design of the MOBIS experiment
Table 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of our participants of the intro-
duction survey and the tracking study and compares them to the transport Microcensus,
which is a representative travel diary survey of the Swiss population undertaken by the
Federal Office of Statistics and the Swiss Federal Office of Spatial Development (2017).
The respondents of the MOBIS introduction survey differ from the Microcensus popula-
tion in terms of the age distribution, as we limited the study to ages 18-65, and in terms
of the regional coverage (only urban agglomerations and excluding the Italian-speaking
region of Switzerland). The MOBIS participants have higher levels of education, employ-
ment and income, much of which was due to the age restriction.4
The tracking sample differs from the introduction survey sample in terms of employ-
ment, household size, income, and access to a car, probably due to the eligibility require-
ment of regularly traveling by car. The distribution across the language regions reflects
their national representation. More details about the design and implementation of the
experiment can be found in Appendix B.
2.2 Tracking app
The participants in the tracking study agreed to download the tracking app “Catch-My-
Day” on their smartphones. Catch-My-Day is a location tracker for iOS and Android,
4When censoring for age, the employment rate in the Microcensus is very similar to that in MO-
BIS.
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Table 1: Demographic information for the MOBIS sample
Variable Level MOBIS Intro Mobis Tracking Microcensus
Control Info Pricing
Age Under 18 13.2
[18, 25] 19.4 18.2 20.0 19.6 9.0
(25, 35] 18.7 18.1 18.5 16.7 14.2
(35, 45] 19.2 22.0 20.8 24.3 15.4
(45, 55] 20.8 22.5 23.6 22.2 16.7
(55, 65] 18.3 18.0 16.0 15.7 12.9
66 and older 3.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 18.5
Education Mandatory 9.1 8.0 5.2 6.8 19.3
Secondary 43.6 47.6 49.4 48.4 49.5
Higher 47.3 44.4 45.5 44.8 31.2
Employment Employed 66.4 72.7 71.3 70.0 48.2
Self-employed 7.4 6.1 5.4 7.4 7.2
Apprentice 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.6
Unemployed 4.3 3.3 4.0 4.5 2.5
Student 9.0 7.5 8.6 7.6 3.7
Retired 3.3 3.5 2.7 3.4 19.3
Other 7.7 5.0 6.4 5.4 16.5
Gender Female 50.6 50.0 50.0 50.5 50.7
Male 49.4 50.0 50.0 49.5 49.3
Household size 1 15.8 11.3 11.6 12.2 34.0
2 33.0 30.1 31.3 29.2 35.4
3 20.0 23.1 21.3 20.0 13.0
4 22.8 25.1 27.7 29.3 12.5
5 or more 8.3 10.3 8.1 9.3 5.1
Income 4 000 CHF or less 12.1 6.8 8.2 7.2 17.8
4 001 - 8 000 CHF 29.9 31.3 30.0 27.4 32.8
8 001 - 12 000 CHF 24.4 27.5 29.5 30.0 17.4
12 001 - 16 000 CHF 11.9 15.6 13.9 14.3 6.8
More than 16 000 CHF 7.9 9.8 9.4 10.5 4.5
Prefer not to say 13.8 9.1 9.0 10.6 20.7
Language German 63.1 66.8 65.0 66.6 68.4
French 28.5 25.5 26.7 26.1 25.3
Italian 6.3
English 8.5 7.8 8.2 7.3
Nationality Switzerland 98.2 98.1 98.0 98.1 75.9
Other 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 24.1
Access to car Yes 61.5 87.3 87.8 88.2 75.8
Sometimes 15.1 11.6 10.7 10.9 18.1
No 23.4 1.1 1.5 0.9 6.2
Full PT subscription Yes 36.8 21.8 24.9 25.3
No 63.2 78.2 75.1 74.7
Half fare PT subscription Yes 47.9 49.2 49.0 48.3
No 52.1 50.8 51.0 51.7
No PT subscription Yes 26.0 33.9 32.6 33.9
No 74.0 66.1 67.4 66.1
Access to bicycle Yes 68.1 72.9 71.8 69.4
Sometimes 4.0 4.5 5.5 3.8
No 27.8 22.6 22.7 26.8
N 21.571 1.225 1.238 1.193 57.090
Notes: Descriptive statistics shown for the MOBIS introduction survey (N = 21,571), the MOBIS control group
(N = 1,225), the MOBIS information group (N = 1,238), the MOBIS pricing and information group (N = 1,193), and
the Swiss Microcensus 2015 (N = 57,090) samples.
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which uses the location services of the respective operating system. The GPS tracks
are stored on the phone and uploaded to the Motiontag analytics platform, where trip
stages are identified and travel modes and activities are imputed. A trip between two
activities can consist of multiple stages, using the same or different modes of transport.
The splitting of a day into stages and activities is called segmentation. This is performed
by the Motiontag app using a machine-learning algorithm.
For each stage, the associated external costs of transport were computed based on
cost factors published by the Swiss Government (see section 3). Participants were able to
review and correct the mode assignment manually.
Figure 2: The Catch-my-Day interface
Note: From left to right: 1) Calendar home page. 2) Daily view showing recorded trips. 3) Editing the
mode of a selected trip.
Figure 2 shows three interfaces of the app. Catch-my-Day provides a best guess of the
travel mode for each stage. The participants could confirm this detected mode or correct
it. This confirm-correct procedure was optional and participants were informed that this
was possible and would be appreciated.5 Around 29% of the stages were confirmed by
the participants. The database stores both their correction and the original algorithmic
5In recent years, state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms for mode and activity detection have
achieved accuracy rates of over 90%, depending on the approach (Wu, Yang and Jing, 2016; Nikolic
and Bierlaire, 2017). Hence, we made validation of the trip purpose and mode optional for participants,
in order to not increase the response burden excessively over the 8 weeks.
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imputation. The possibility for mode correction increases the accuracy of the mode de-
tection, but it also introduces a scope for “gaming” the experiment. We return to this
issue in section 5.6.
The following modes are detected the by Catch-my-Day app: Air plane, bicycle, bus,
car, ferry, train (local, regional and long-distance), tram and walk. In addition, users could
select the following modes as a correction: Boat, car sharing, gondola, motorbike/scooter,
Taxi/Uber. E-bikes and E-Scooters were not detectable or selectable.
The mode detection provided by the tracking app was a key component of the MOBIS
study. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to incentivise changes in
mobility behavior based on the output of a mode detection algorithm. As seen in the
tables containing the average detection accuracy by mode (Table B.1) and the mode
detection matrix (Table B.2) in the Appendix, the algorithm worked exceptionally well,
with an overall accuracy of over 90% for both operating systems.
2.3 Treatments
The recruitment took place on a rolling basis between August and November of 2019.
Once a participant registered the first track on the app, he or she automatically became
part of the RCT sample. The participants did not know at this stage that they were
part of an experiment. The RCT consisted of 4 weeks of observation for all participants,
followed by another 4 weeks of one of two treatments.6 Assignment to the treatment
and control groups was fully randomized without any form of stratification. During the
observation period, participants were presented with a weekly summary of their travel
behavior by mode of transport, including duration, distance and number of trips.
On study day 29, the participants assigned to the “Information only” and “Pricing”
treatments received an e-mail that informed them about the external costs of transport,
how they are computed and monetized and what they could do to reduce them. The
e-mail contained a link to a table with per-km monetized costs by mode. The congestion
cost was framed as an example, as it varies by time and place.To complement this ex-ante
price information and to provide the participants with an idea about their individual level
of external costs (i.e., including congestion) that the participant individually caused, they
were also shown a personalized summary of the previous week.7 For the remainder of the
6The study concluded just before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic at the beginning of 2020.
Some of the participants agreed to re-start tracking, as part of an effort to study travel patterns in
response to COVID-19 policies. Preliminary results of this ongoing study have been reported in Molloy
et al. (2020).
7To provide participants with ex-ante information about the congestion costs for particular trips
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treatment period, the participants were presented with weekly summaries such that they
could observe changes in their external costs. The external costs were always presented
by mode of transport and by type of cost (health, climate and congestion).
The participants assigned to the “Pricing” treatment received the same information
about the external costs as the “Information” group, but in addition were given a budget
from which the external costs of transport were deducted. The participants were informed
on day 29 that as of now, their budget would be used to pay for the external costs caused
by their travel, and that any money left over in their account at the end of the study
was theirs to keep. This individualized budget was computed based on each participants’
external costs during the observation period, plus 20 % for a buffer to allow for the
possibility that some participants had to increase their external costs of transport for
idiosyncratic reasons.8 This treatment thus simulated transport pricing based on the
monetized marginal external costs of transport.
The weekly reports were comprised of modular panels, as shown in Figure 3. The
introduction and distance by mode panels were presented to all participants in both study
phases. The external cost and chart explanation panels were shown to the information
and pricing groups in the treatment phase, and the remaining budget panel (middle
module on the left) only to the pricing group during the treatment phase. Due to the
rolling start of the experiment, participants received these reports on different days of the
week. Participants in the control group continued to received a weekly email with their
kilometers traveled per mode throughout the experiment. Once the RCT was concluded,
all participants were informed about having taken part in a research experiment.9
In principle, we could have used any pricing scheme and estimated the participants
response to it. We chose the Pigovian rate (i.e., the marginal external costs) for three rea-
sons. First, internalizing the external costs of transport can be motivated and explained
to people on normative grounds. The “information only” treatment could thus be inter-
preted as providing information about societal costs about which the participants were
likely not perfectly informed. In contrast, introducing a price unrelated to the external
was infeasible within the project budget as this would have required a lot of additional programming
and presumably also a different app. However, it is not clear to what extent the participants would
have actually relied on such detailed information. Furthermore, the internal part of congestion costs
are experienced personally, such that participants have an idea about the expected congestion in their
area. We believe that combining ex-ante averages with ex-post individualized numbers is a reasonable
compromise that sends a price signal without overly taxing participants’ attention.
8The average budget was CHF 144, but for some participants it exceeded CHF 700. Note that once
participants reached the treatment phase, they could no longer correct the modes during the observa-
tion phase in order to prevent a strategic increase of the mobility budget.
9This procedure was pre-approved by ETH’s Institutional Review Board.
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Figure 3: Weekly reports by e-mail
Note: The participants in the control group received only the report on the left, but without the
middle module titled “Remaining Budget”. The participants in the information group additionally
received the message on the right. The participants in the pricing group received all modules.
costs would not contain useful information (other than the price signal itself) and thus
not lead to behavioral change via an altruistic motive. Second, using the Pigovian rate
and estimating people’s response to it serves as a policy benchmark.10 If larger (smaller)
responses are required, the policy maker can choose to exceed (stay below) this rate, but
we believe that knowing the level and people’s response to the first-best transport price
is useful information. Last but not least, the use of the Pigovian rate was a condition
imposed by one of the federal agencies that co-funded the project.
10Technically speaking, the Pigovian rate is the marginal social damage at the social optimum, such
that the pricing implemented in the experiment likely deviates from the true Pigovian tax. If such a
scheme were implemented in practice, however, one would need to monitor the external costs anyway
and update the scheme from time to time, such that the social optimum would be reached iteratively.
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3 The external costs of transport
The health, emissions, noise and congestion costs of the mobility behavior are computed
on the recorded daily trips using an automated data pipeline. Additionally, data collected
from the online introduction survey was incorporated into the data processing pipeline to
improve the imputation.
3.1 Costs associated with driving
For the calculation of external costs in private road transport, the recorded GPS tracks are
aligned to the road network using Graphhopper (Karich and Schröder, 2014) and processed
using modules developed on top of the MATSim framework to calculate the external costs
of congestion and emissions. The emissions factors are taken from the HBEFA database
(version 3.3), and applied using the MATSim emissions module (Hülsmann et al., 2011;
Kickhöfer et al., 2013). For congestion, an average marginal cost approach incorporating
spillback effects and flow congestion was applied, based on the work of Kaddoura (2015).
These modules returned quantities of the externalities in grams (for emissions) and seconds
of caused delay (for congestion) for road transport, which were then converted to monetary
costs using the values in Table 2.
Table 2: Monetization of externalities
Emission Aspect Value Unit
Scenario year 2019




NOx Regional 7,109 CHF/ton
VTTS National 25.77 CHF/h a
Source: Federal Roads Office - ASTRA (2017), updated for 2019; a scaled nominal wage rate
Figure 4 illustrates the externalities pipeline for motorized private transport. The ob-
jects in bold are those developed as part of this project. Dotted lines indicate data inputs
from static sources, and solid lines are the flow of the GPS-based trip data through the
model. The lack of flows inside the MATSim framework is intentional, as those modules
are built on top of the MATSim event framework (Horni, Nagel and Axhausen, 2016).
Molloy, Tchervenkov and Axhausen (2021) contains more details about the externalities
pipeline.
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Figure 4: MATSim-based externalities pipeline
Source: Molloy, Tchervenkov and Axhausen (2021)
3.2 Costs of public and active transport
For modes other than driving, the per-km values presented in Table 3 were applied to the
recorded length of the trip. The health effects include accident costs (most of which are
external to the people involved due to coverage by the Swiss health care system), but also
the external portion of health benefits in the form of a reduced mortality and morbidity
as a consequence of physical activity (Götschi, Garrard and Giles-Corti, 2016). Whereas
walking is associated with net external benefits, the external accident costs outweigh the
external health benefits from cycling, such that bicycling is associated with small net
external costs in the experiment.11
The marginal social cost of public transport (in terms of pollution and noise) de-
creases as the occupancy rate increases. On the other hand, crowding affects willingness
to pay and can be seen as a form of congestion in public transport, and delay in some
circumstances (Tirachini, Hensher and Rose, 2013). Crowding effects are extremely het-
erogeneous, both spatially and temporally. Even in peak hour, crowding can be restricted
to particular transit lines during very short periods (Zurich Public Transport, 2017). We
thus feel that it would be unreasonable to distribute the crowding effects in an aggre-
gate measure across peak hour travelers in a specific public transit region. Additionally,
11Most of the positive health effects are private in the form of lower morbidity and mortality and at
least partly internalized by cyclists (Götschi and Hintermann, 2014).
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Table 3: Per-km monetary costs (in CHF) used in the MOBIS experiment
Mode CO2 PM10 NOx Accidents Noise Health
Train 0.000066 0.0140 - 0.00066 0.0087 -
Bus 0.0144 0.0437 0.5440 0.0141 0.0257 -
Tram - - - 0.0126 0.0075 -
Bicycle - - - 0.257 - -0.1870
Walk - - - 0.075 - -0.1863
Notes: Federal Roads Office - ASTRA (2017) does not report CO2 values for Tram, but this
would be small. Negative costs indicate an external benefit. The external costs of driving vary over
time and space and were computed within MATSim (see Fig. 4).
for each public transport operator, data would have to be collected separately and col-
lated as it is not available on a national level. As a practical solution, a zonal peak-hour
surcharge pricing scheme was developed for the national public transport network, as a
form of second-best pricing. Throughout the experiment, participants had access to a
interactive map which showed them where and when the pricing scheme applied. The
peak-hour pricing surcharge of 0.10 CHF/km was applied to transit stages between any
two zones which experience peak hour demand. The peak hour windows and the affected
zone-pairs were determined using the MATSim scenario output for Switzerland (Bösch,
Müller and Ciari, 2016). The peak windows were set as 7am to 9am and 5pm to 7pm, and
not adapted for regional variations in working patterns. Municipality pairs were priced
if the maximum hourly transit trip count during peak hour was greater than three times
the average hourly transit trip count during the daily off-peak (9am - 5pm) for that pair.
A municipality could also be paired with itself if the above criteria was met, and the
direction of the peak hour flow is not considered. If the trip was partially in both the
peak and off-peak periods, only the proportion of the travel duration that overlaps with
the peak period was charged.
4 Regression framework
Given that we randomize the treatment and thus no self-selection or endogeneity issues
need to be addressed, the econometrics involved in estimating the average treatment effect
(ATE) are straightforward. After aggregating the data to the person-day level, the ATE
can be estimated by
Yits = c0 + α
P ·DiDPits + αI ·DiDIits + µi + µt + µs + εits (1)
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The dependent variable is the outcome of interest for person i ∈ (1, ..., N) on calendar
day t ∈ (1, ..., T ) and day of study s ∈ (1, ..., 56). This can be the total quantity of external
costs, the external costs along a particular dimension (health, climate and congestion),
distance traveled in total or by mode, the mode share, or additional outcomes as specified
in the results section.
The two difference-in-differences terms DiDPits and DiD
I
its are the products of treat-
ment group and treatment period dummies and are equal to one if the pricing (P) and
information treatment (I), respectively, are active for person i on a particular day and
zero otherwise. The treatment starts on the 29th day of the experiment. Due to the
rolling recruitment, the beginning of the experiment varies by person. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity, we include fixed effects on the person (µi), calendar day (µt)
and day-of-study (µs) level. The calendar day-fixed effects capture common shocks that
affect travel (and thus the associated external costs) for everyone in Switzerland, e.g.,
due to a national holiday or a sports event. The day-of-sample fixed effects account for
the possibility that respondents may respond differently to the treatment over time. We
find a high variation on the first day (presumably due to technical issues and learning
by participants) and on day 29 (the first day of the treatment, and some people may
have been slow to check their e-mails). We remove these two days from the analysis.
The combination of day-of-study and calendar day FE implies that the treatment effect
is computed by comparing participants in the treatment and control groups that started
the experiment on the same day. Finally, the error term εits has an expected mean of zero
and a variance of σ. We allow for a correlation of the error within participants.
Due to the random assignment, we do not need to control for any covariates as they
are expected to affect the treatment and control groups equally. This leads to a fully
nonparametric regression in which we compare simple means between treated and control
observations. However, because weather information is an important predictor for mobil-
ity, especially for leisure activities and for active transport modes, we enrich our tracking
data with temperature and precipitation data from MeteoSwiss provided on a 1 x 1 km
grid.12 This could reduce the noise in the regression and thus increase the precision of
our estimates, but at the cost of introducing a parametric assumption.
The weather variables are assigned separately for each recorded trip based on the
nearest weather station. To allow for a nonlinear effect of temperature on travel choices,
12The data is provided by www.meteoswiss.admin.ch.
14
we define the level of “Heat” and and “Cold” for an observed trip j on day t as follows:
Heatjt ≡ max {tmaxjt − 25, 0} (2)
Coldjt ≡ max {10− tminjt , 0} (3)
The variables tmaxjt and t
min
jt refer to the daily maximum and minimum temperature,
respectively, recorded in degrees Celsius at the weather station closest to the departure
location for trip j. In addition, we included the daily precipitation (recorded between 6
am and 6 am on the following day). To compute the values per person and day (which is
our unit of analysis), we take the average of the heat, cold and precipitation values across
all trips taken by person i on day t and add them as linear control variables to (1).
The ATE of pricing plus information is given by the coefficient estimate αP ; the ATE
for information only is given by αI ; and the ATE of adding pricing to information is their
difference, αP −αI . This cannot be interpreted as the effect of pricing per se, as adding a
price could make the information more salient or interact with it in some other manner.
We emphasize that αP − αI could also be computed by running a DiD analysis on the
pricing group while using the information group as the control. It is therefore a causal
ATE in its own right, rather than simply a difference between two coefficients.
To investigate potential differences of the treatment effect along major socio-economic
variables, we interact the DiD terms in eq. (1) with categorical variables denoting, e.g.,
gender or income groups. For the regressions that use external costs as the dependent
variable, we estimate (1) in levels. Estimation in levels (rather than in logs) is necessary as
the external benefit associated with walking renders a number of person-day observations
negative. We then compute the proportional response by dividing the coefficients (which
are in CHF) the external costs generated during the observation period. For regressions
in which the dependent variable is non-negative (e.g., distance traveled), we estimate
proportional effects directly by using a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
model. We prefer this approach to taking logarithms due to the possible presence of
heteroskedasticity, which can lead to a bias in log-linearized regressions, and the presence
of zeroes in the data.13
13For a discussion of the advantages of using a Poisson model in the presence of zeroes and het-
eroskedasticity, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). We use Stata’s ppmlhdfe command that was




Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the tracking data for overall travel. Table A.1 in
the Appendix shows the data separately for each mode.
Table 4: Tracking summary statistics
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Dimension Outcome Control Info Pricing Control Info Pricing
Ext. costs Total 4.498 4.579 4.686 4.218 4.252 4.218
(CHF) (5.690) (5.650) (5.811) (5.392) (5.549) (5.408)
Congestion 1.045 1.076 1.151 0.858 0.878 0.904
(1.584) (1.582) (1.705) (1.445) (1.539) (1.524)
Climate 0.880 0.883 0.894 0.849 0.838 0.829
(1.295) (1.293) (1.295) (1.235) (1.286) (1.222)
Health 2.573 2.619 2.640 2.510 2.536 2.485
(3.551) (3.546) (3.609) (3.476) (3.561) (3.460)
Private costs 26.103 26.683 26.827 25.719 25.988 25.476
(CHF) (33.824) (34.080) (34.587) (33.403) (34.068) (33.134)
Tracking Trips 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.67 4.64 4.71
(3.11) (3.08) (3.04) (2.89) (2.88) (2.92)
Distance (km) 47.408 48.388 49.854 45.954 47.789 47.784
(55.789) (54.978) (57.720) (54.331) (56.246) (55.269)
Duration (min) 96.364 97.176 98.453 92.698 95.443 95.421
(92.890) (88.568) (93.527) (88.397) (93.972) (92.736)
Notes:
Average values per participant and day during the experiment (standard dev. in parentheses).
Figure 5 displays the mode distribution recorded in MOBIS in terms of distance (panel
a), number of trips (panel b) and external costs (panel c). Almost two-thirds of the
recorded distance is traveled by car, whereas the majority of stage counts correspond to
walking. The vast majority of external costs is associated with driving. Panel d shows
the constant per-km external costs for walking and bicycling, as well as the distribution
of external per-km costs for driving and public transport, which vary over space and time
due to congestion and crowding.
We observe a seasonal variation in the travel distance by mode, which translates to a
negative trend in external costs. Including a control group allows us to control for such
trends. In contrast, if the treatment effect were estimated based on a before-vs.-after
approach, as in most of the previous literature, the results would be biased towards a
larger effect as the decrease in external costs over time would also be attributed to the
treatment.
16
Figure 5: Mode distribution of distances, trips and external costs
Notes: For the external costs of walking and cycling, fixed values per person-km were used
(see Tables 2-3). The external costs of public transport vary over time and space.
Before using the data for analysis, it was cleaned using some routine procedures that
check for plausibility and remove obviously problematic data. In addition, we removed
the data if one of the following was true: Average daily speed for car and PT above 100
km/h, above 40 km/h for bicycling and above 20 km/h for walking; or more than 500
km/day for car and PT, and more than 20 km/day for walking. If one of these limites
was exceeded, we removed this person-day observation.
5.2 Average treatment effects
Table 5 shows the average treatment effect (ATE) on the external costs of travel in CHF
per day. Due to the randomization and the presence of the control group, these are the
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causal effects of introducing price incentives and/or providing information. The first two
columns report the results for the total external costs of transport, with and without
controlling for the weather, whereas the next three pairs of columns contain the ATE on
the external health, climate and congestion costs. About half of the reduction in external
costs is due to a decrease in health costs, followed in magnitude by congestion and then
climate costs. Including the weather does not significantly change the ATE.
Table 5: Average treatment effects on external costs
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.215** -0.215** -0.108** -0.109* -0.036* -0.035* -0.070** -0.070**
(0.069) (0.072) (0.043) (0.045) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
Information -0.087 -0.091 -0.046 -0.048 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022
(0.069) (0.069) (0.043) (0.043) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
Pricing-Inf. -0.127’ -0.125’ -0.063 -0.061 -0.017 -0.016 -0.048* -0.048*
(0.071) (0.071) (0.044) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
Precipitation 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Heat 0.177** 0.148** 0.055** -0.026**
(0.018) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
Cold -0.501** -0.357** -0.128** -0.016
(0.075) (0.050) (0.017) (0.019)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.234 0.225 0.227 0.221 0.223 0.268 0.269
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1 (based on two-sided testing). The dependent
variable is the external cost of transport aggregated to the person-day level. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the participant level. Precipitation (“rain”) is measured in
mm per hour; heat and cold are as defined be eqs. (2)-(3). All regressions include calendar
day, day of study and person fixed effects.
Figure 6 shows the proportional reduction of the external costs of transport caused by
the two treatments. The proportional effect for the external costs related to health and
climate is comparable to the effect on total external costs, whereas the effect for conges-
tion was somewhat stronger. There may be a treatment effect associated with providing
only information (yellow bars), but this effect is weaker and not statistically significant
at conventional levels, at least not for the overall sample (see below for a sub-sample
analysis). The figure also shows the differential effect, which is the causal effect of adding
pricing to information. This effect is statistically significant for congestion, indicating
that including a monetary component is relatively more important for congestion than
for the other types of external costs. A possible explanation is that the external costs in
terms of health and climate may be more salient (and more intuitive) than the external
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costs associated with congestion.
Figure 6: Treatment effect on the external costs of transport
Note: The figure shows the average treatment effect for overall travel from Table 5.
Proportional effects were computed by scaling the regression coefficients by the average
external cost of the control group during the treatment period. The bars denote
95%-confidence intervals.
An event-study graph of the treatment effect by study day reveals no pronounced
learning effects (see Fig. A.2 in the Appendix), but lack of statistical power for a given
day leads to very noisy estimates. Furthermore, as part of a series of robustness tests
(see below), we find no difference between the ATE as estimated based on weeks 5 & 6 as
opposed to weeks 7 & 8. This supports our underlying hypothesis of a stable treatment
effect with respect to the treatment time.
Figure A.3 in the Appendix shows the treatment effect for the external costs associated
with driving and public transport (the regression estimates underlying this figure are
shown in Table A.12). Whereas the proportional reduction of the external costs is similar
for driving as for overall travel, we find no significant effect on total costs for PT travel,
and a positive effect for health and climate costs. This suggests a mode shift that we will
address in more detail below.
On average, the respondents in the pricing group reduced their external costs of trans-
port by 5.1% relative to the control group. To interpret the magnitude of this effect, we
have to compare this response to the change in the total price due to the implementation
of the pricing scheme, i.e., the price including the private costs.
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To compute the private costs of transport, we make the following assumptions: The
private cost of active transport (cycling and walking) is zero; we thus abstract from
the purchase or rental price of bicycles. For public transport, we use the ticket price as a
reference, either full or half fare depending on whether a particular participant holds a half-
fare discount card. For participants that hold a public transport pass, we approximated
the average cost by multiplying the half-fare ticket with a factor that is less than one.
The level of the factor is determined by comparing the cost of a regional PT subscription
with the corresponding cost if one were to buy a daily pass on 22 days per month.14 For
driving, we use an average value of CHF 0.70 per km, which is the official value used for
deducting commuting expenses from taxable income, and also very close to the value that
the respondents in the final survey reported as their average costs of driving.
Given these assumptions, the average daily private cost of transport for the control
group during the treatment period was CHF 25.72. The external cost was CHF 4.22,
which corresponds to a price increase of 16.4%. Dividing the ATE by the average external
costs leads to a proportional reduction of 5.1% (this is the point estimate in Figure 6).
The resulting elasticity, in terms of a percentage reduction in external costs in response
to a one-percent increase in the costs of transport is therefore -5.1/16.4=-0.31.15 This
implies that introducing a transport pricing scheme based on external costs that raises
total transport costs, on average, by 10 % would lead to a reduction in the external costs
of transport by 3.1% in the short run.
Table 6 shows the sensitivity of the results with respect to controlling for the different
levels of fixed effects, the weather and using a control group. The preferred model is in
column (1). Adding the weather variables has no effect on the ATE, as already shown
above. Removing either the day of study fixed effects (columns 3-4) or the calendar
day fixed effects (columns 5-6) does not significantly change the results; however, when
removing both, the elasticity more than doubles (columns 7-8). Controlling for unobserved
characteristics that vary over time is therefore crucial for identification. When estimating
the ATE using only before-vs-after data for the pricing group, the resulting elasticity is
around -0.38 if calendar day FE are included, and between -0.57 and -0.71 without (day
of study FE cannot be included in this setting as they would be collinear with the “Post”
dummy). This highlights the importance of including a control group that is exposed
to the same shocks as the treatment group. The elasticity is significantly over-estimated
14The savings implicit in the subscription ranges from 24% in Geneva to 76% in Basel.
15This is the elasticity of external costs with respect to the total price of transport. The elasticity of
the external costs with respect to the externality-related price cannot be computed as the latter is zero
before the treatment.
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in the before-vs.-after setting, because the treatment also absorbs a part of the seasonal
and day of study-effects. Controlling for the weather or calendar day FE mitigates the
problem, but it cannot fully remove the bias.
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Pricing -0.215** -0.216** -0.228** -0.231** -0.218** -0.214** -0.470** -0.536**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.064) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.052) (0.054)
Information -0.087 -0.091 -0.101’ -0.105’ -0.088 -0.085* -0.341** -0.408**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.060) (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) (0.049) (0.051)
Precipitation 0.0002 0.002 -0.003** -0.005* 0.003 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
Heat 0.177** 0.177** 0.042** 0.024** 0.193** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.030) (0.010)
Cold -0.501** -0.499** -0.250** -0.189** -0.388** -0.256**
(0.075) (0.075) (0.039) (0.037) (0.136) (0.076)
Post -0.310** -0.312** -0.470** -0.584**
(0.106) (0.106) (0.052) (0.057)
Prop. effect -0.051 -0.051 -0.054 -0.055 -0.052 -0.051 -0.111 -0.127 -0.066 -0.067 -0.100 -0.125
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011)
Elasticity -0.310 -0.312 -0.330 -0.333 -0.315 -0.310 -0.679 -0.774 -0.378 -0.381 -0.574 -0.714
(0.104) (0.104) (0.092) (0.092) (0.104) (0.104) (0.078) (0.080) (0.128) (0.127) (0.060) (0.065)
Person FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Cal. day FE X X X X     X X  
Study day FE X X   X X      
Adj. R2 0.232 0.234 0.232 0.234 0.229 0.230 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.229 0.224 0.225
Cluster 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 1,193 1,193 1,193 1,193
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 52,229 52,229 52,229 52,229
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at participant level. The dummy variable
“post” takes the value of one during the treatment period (study days 29-56), and zero otherwise. The daily external cost and the price
increase implied by Pigovian transport pricing is based on the control group during the treatment phase and is 4.22 CHF and 16.4%,
respectively (columns 1-8). For the before-vs.-after analysis in columns (9)-(12), the daily external cost (CHF 4.69) and price increase
(17.5%) was computed for the pricing group during the observation phase.
5.3 Effect heterogeneity
The overall effect could mask heterogeneous responses within different segments of the
population. Figure 7 shows the treatment effects on total external costs for different
subgroups of the sample; the regression results, including those pertaining to the cost cat-
egories, are presented in Tables A.3-A.10 in the Appendix. We find that men respond more
strongly to both treatments than women, and the difference is particularly pronounced for
congestion costs.16 The treatment effect also differs across the language regions. However,
for most socio-demographic variables, we do not find statistically significant differences,
or only for cost subgroups.
16The graphs show the coefficient on the base category (e.g., for women, whose gender dummmy is
coded as male=0) and the sum of the coefficient on the base category and the coefficient on the inter-
action term (e.g., pricing x male). Whether two groups have statistically different effects can be seen
from the p-value of the coefficient of the interaction term, which is reported in Tables A.3-A.10.
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Figure 7: Treatment effect heterogeneity
Notes: Results from including interaction dummies in the DiD regression. The bars denote
95%-confidence intervals. The results are given in CHF per day.
In the final survey conducted after the experiment was concluded, a battery of ques-
tions was used to elicit respondents’ personal values (Schwartz, 1992; De Groot and Steg,
2010). Using this methodology, respondents were assigned an index along four dimensions
labeled “altruistic”, “egoistic”, “hedonic” and “biospheric”. The study participants that
scored above the median in terms of the altruistic index responded significantly not only
to pricing, but also to information alone. There were no statistically significant differences
along the other three “values” dimensions.
The concept of (and our definition for) the external costs of transport was explained to
the participants of the treatment groups at the beginning of the treatment. We included
a question in the final survey to gauge the heterogeneity with respect to the uptake of
this information. More specifically, the participants in the treatment groups were asked
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to identify the correct definition of “external costs of transport” among a list of four
possible options. The last group of coefficients in Figure 7 shows the ATE separately for
those that could correctly identify the definition of the external costs of transport used
in the experiment (45% of the sample) vs. those that could not. The results imply that
the treatment effect for pricing is driven by the respondents that answered the question
correctly. On the other hand, knowledge about the definition of external costs was not
generally associated with an increased response to the information-only treatment.
The interaction effects shown in Figure 7 and Tables A.3-A.10 are univariate correla-
tions and have no causal interpretation. In order to investigate the effect heterogeneity
further, we employ a “causal forest” approach based on the generalized regression forest
algorithm proposed by Wager and Athey (2018) and implemented in the R package grf
(Tibshirani, Athey and Wager, 2020). In contrast to the regression approach, the causal
forest is agnostic as to which individual characteristics may generate heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. The regression trees in the causal forest algorithm are grown by conditioning
on those variables that generate the most heterogeneous treatment effects at each node.
This procedure is repeated many times on samples randomly drawn without replacement
from the data to form a causal forest. The splits can be tallied across trees to arrive at
a measure for the most important splitting variables, weighted by the level at which the
splits occur. The earlier the split, the higher the weight assigned to that variable in the
importance measure. This results in a list of “most important” variables in the sense that
they generate the strongest heterogeneity in the ATE.
Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the conditional treatment effect
using the causal forest algorithm, both for the pricing and the information-only treatment.
The relative variable importance derived from the algorithm is shown in Figure A.5. To
interpret this measure, we also included a continuous and a discrete random variable. The
variables with a higher importance ranking than these random variables can be treated
as likely candidates to explain the effect heterogeneity.
Table 7 shows the results of a multivariate regression that includes 15 potentially
relevant categorical variables that are interacted with the DiD term in a multi-variate
regression. The variables were selected based on their “importance” measure, the results
displayed in Fig. 7) and economic theory.17 We find that when controlling for these
dimensions simultaneously, the pricing effect is stronger (i.e., more negative) for partici-
pants that (i) answered the “exam question” correctly, (ii) are below 30 years of age and
17We are aware that a multivariate regression will not necessarily identify causal effects. However,
to the extent that the covariates are correlated with each other, the multivariate regression provides
“better controlled” estimates than the univariate regressions that are the basis for Fig. 7.
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Table 7: Multivariate interactions
Total costs Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing Info Pricing Info Pricing Info Princing Info
Base 0.258 0.128 0.146 0.050 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.021
(0.178) (0.178) (0.109) (0.116) (0.04) (0.041) (0.056) (0.048)
Correct=1 -0.401** -0.099 -0.253** -0.071 -0.087** -0.037 -0.061’ 0.01
(0.109) (0.102) (0.068) (0.064) (0.025) (0.023) (0.035) (0.032)
Age≥55 -0.112 0.009 -0.079 -0.032 -0.048 -0.001 0.015 0.042
(0.151) (0.147) (0.094) (0.09) (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.042)
Age≤30 -0.406** 0.009 -0.239** 0.074 -0.100** 0.024 -0.067’ 0.056
(0.132) (0.117) (0.081) (0.074) (0.031) (0.027) (0.041) (0.037)
Egoistic=1 0.018 -0.05 0.036 -0.039 0.021 -0.031 -0.039 0.02
(0.109) (0.108) (0.067) (0.068) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.032)
Altruistic=1 -0.138 -0.224* -0.083 -0.117’ -0.027 -0.045’ -0.027 -0.063*
(0.118) (0.110) (0.073) (0.071) (0.027) (0.025) (0.038) (0.032)
Hedonic=1 0.111 -0.065 0.051 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.042 -0.076*
(0.114) (0.11) (0.069) (0.068) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.032)
Biospheric=1 -0.164 0.094 -0.097 0.053 -0.036 0.022 -0.031 0.018
(0.122) (0.117) (0.077) (0.075) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038) (0.033)
Income>12k -0.116 0.021 -0.013 0.028 -0.006 -0.016 -0.097* 0.009
(0.141) (0.135) (0.084) (0.085) (0.034) (0.031) (0.049) (0.042)
Income<8k 0.205’ -0.021 0.081 -0.049 0.043 -0.003 0.082* 0.031
(0.121) (0.117) (0.075) (0.072) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.035)
HH size>4 -0.199 0.245 -0.14 0.149 -0.089* 0.046 0.031 0.05
(0.186) (0.186) (0.117) (0.107) (0.044) (0.051) (0.047) (0.053)
HH size<3 -0.181 -0.057 -0.04 -0.014 -0.042 -0.031 -0.099** -0.012
(0.118) (0.112) (0.073) (0.07) (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.034)
French=1 0.204’ 0.003 0.115 -0.032 0.037 -0.017 0.053 0.052
(0.120) (0.109) (0.077) (0.069) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.033)
Tert. educ -0.052 -0.056 -0.07 -0.039 -0.011 -0.022 0.03 0.005
(0.112) (0.107) (0.068) (0.067) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.031)
Male=1 -0.195’ -0.165’ -0.066 -0.02 -0.021 -0.022 -0.108** -0.123**
(0.109) (0.100) (0.068) (0.062) (0.025) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031)
Weekend=1 0.12 0.179 0.058 0.089 0.041 0.019 0.022 0.071*
(0.122) (0.118) (0.077) (0.075) (0.027) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036)
Adjusted Rˆ2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.269
Clusters 3,486 3,486 3,486 3,486
N 155,517 155,517 155,517 155,517
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered
at the participant level. The dependent variable is the external cost of transport aggre-
gated to the person-day level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the partic-
ipant level. The “Pricing” and “Info” columns indicate the type of DiD term with which
the interaction terms have been multiplied. All dimensions also include one omitted cate-
gory. The “Base” coefficient is thus associated with an observation that has a zero for all
included dummies.
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Table 8: Elasticities for subsamples

















Male=1 -5.88 -10.48 -1.27 16.47 16.21 16.73 -0.36 -0.64 -0.08 0.012 80,338
Male=0 -4.09 -8.81 0.63 16.32 16.06 16.58 -0.25 -0.54 0.04 0.089 80,863
Correct=1 -10.57 -14.93 -6.20 16.40 16.22 16.59 -0.64 -0.91 -0.38 <0.001 103,685
Correct=0 0.03 -3.72 3.78 16.40 16.22 16.58 0.00 -0.23 0.23 0.989 115,038
French=1 2.33 -4.72 9.37 16.79 16.40 17.19 0.14 -0.28 0.56 0.518 42,014
French=0 -7.39 -11.20 -3.57 16.29 16.09 16.50 -0.45 -0.69 -0.22 <0.001 119,190
Inc. <8000 -2.51 -51.10 20.04 16.15 15.87 16.44 -0.16 -0.51 0.20 0.392 59,779
Inc >=8000 -6.28 -10.29 -2.28 16.55 16.31 16.79 -0.38 -0.62 -0.14 0.002 101,425
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at participant level.
The dummy variable “post” takes the value of one during the treatment period (study days 29-56), and zero oth-
erwise.
(iii) men, and it is weaker for (iv) French speakers and (v) those with a household income
below CHF 8,000 per month. The effect of information alone on total external costs is
stronger for (i) altruists and (ii) men. The effect heterogeneity for the individual cost
dimensions is overall similar, but there are also some differences. For example, we see
that people with a high household income reduced their congestion costs by more than
the reference category.
Table 8 presents the proportional effects, price increases and resulting elasticities for
the sub-samples for which we found the largest effect heterogeneity of the pricing treat-
ment. The elasticity of the participants that correctly identified the external costs in the
“exam” question is in fact -0.64, whereas the elasticity of the rest of the sample (around
55% of the participants in the treatment groups) is precisely centered around zero. The
ATE is thus exclusively driven by those participants that understood the nature of the
experiment. The table also shows the elasticity for men vs. women, French- vs. German-
speakers and people with a monthly household income above/below CHF 8,000.
5.4 Mechanisms
People can reduce their external costs of transport in different ways: Travel less, substi-
tute towards modes associated with lower external costs and choose different routes and
departure times. To shed light on potential mechanisms, Figure 8 shows the effect of the
pricing treatment on various outcomes. The regression results underlying this figure are
shown in Tables A.11 - A.14 in the Appendix.
The treatment did not significantly reduce overall travel distances, but we measure
a statistically significant reduction in car distance countered by increases in the other
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modes (panel a). The effect can be seen separately on the intensive margin in panel b
(i.e., conditional on traveling with a particular mode on a given day) and on the extensive
margin in panel c (i.e., the probability of traveling). The mode shift becomes even more
pronounced if the treatment effect is shown for mode share in terms of distance (panel
d). There is a statistically significant reduction in the share of car distance by about 3%
and an increase in the share of public transport, bicycling and walking.
Figure 8: Mechanisms underlying the reduction in external costs
Note: The bars denote 95%-confidence intervals, corresponding to a two-sided test at p<0.05.
In panels (a), (b), (d) and (e), the treatment effects are computed using a Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (ppml) regression. Panel (c) shows the marginal results of a logit
regression. In panel (f), a linear DiD-specification is chosen with the departure time
(measured in minutes after midnight) as the dependent variable.
The pricing treatment significantly reduced congestion costs per km of car travel (panel
e), implying that modal shift is not the only mechanism responsible for the reduction in
external costs. The reduction in congestion per km can be due to a change in route and/or
a change in departure time. Using the departure time (in minutes) as the dependent
variable, we observe a significant shift in the departure times for car trips in the morning
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towards earlier departures, but no effect in the evening (panel f). There was no reduction
in crowding for public transport, nor was there an effect on PT departure time. The
treatment did not change the average car and PT speed on a daily level.
5.5 Acceptability
Even if transport pricing works, its implementation may be challenging not only in terms
of technology and data confidentiality, but also in terms of social acceptability. In the in-
troduction survey, we included three questions designed to elicit respondents’ preferences
about a possible introduction of transport pricing. In order not to reveal the purpose
of the experiment, these questions were part of a larger number of queries posed to the
respondents. The three questions aimed at the same concept but were worded differently.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each policy:
Time- and route-specific mobility pricing, made revenue-neutral by lowering other taxes.
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
The price for mobility should reflect the social cost (e.g., health, environment, congestion).
The transport network should be used more efficiently by introducing dynamic pricing.
Figure 9 shows the responses. A majority of the respondents were either positive or
neutral if the question was worded with respect to social costs or revenue-neutral transport
(or mobility) pricing.18 However, if the focus was placed on the time-varying nature of
this pricing, the majority were opposed. This suggests that transport pricing could, in
principle, find a political majority, but that it depends on how it is communicated.
In the final survey, we followed up on the issue of revenue use. The a majority of the
participants preferred at least some of the money to be used for transport projects, whereas
fewer than 8% indicated that they preferred the revenue to be returned to households (Fig.
A.1). The revenue neutrality embedded in the question about mobility pricing thus likely
led to a lower level of approval, ceteris paribus.
18The same questions were asked again in the final survey, which took place after the experiment.
Despite the different samples (21,800 respondents of the introduction survey vs. 3,521 participants in
the tracking study), the answers were qualitatively similar. There was also no systematic difference in
the answers of the three experimental groups.
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Note: The figure shows participants’ responses to the questions described in the main text.
5.6 Robustness tests
In this subsection, we address problems that could potentially threaten the validity of our
results.
Observation effect
As mentioned in Section 5.1, we observe a reduction in the external costs of travel during
the course of the experiment. This is partly due to a seasonal effect, but the effect persists
even after controlling for seasonality. Table 9 shows the results from regressing the daily
external costs of travel during the observation phase on dummies denoting membership in
the Pricing and the Information groups, calendar day FE and a linear day-of-study trend.
This trend is significant and indicates that the external costs from all travel decrease by
1.5 cents per study day (column 1). However, there is no difference in this trend across
the groups (column 2), which is crucial for identification purposes. Columns 3-6 show
that the trend is caused by a reduction in the external costs of driving. When using
distance as the dependent variable (Table A.15), the results indicate that there may be
a shift away from driving and towards public transport during the pre-treatment period,
but this shift is the same for all groups.
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Table 9: Trends in external costs
All Travel All Travel Car PT Bicycle Walking
Info 8.574 -4.206 -6.704 4.167 -0.452 -1.217
(12.071) (15.902) (16.114) (2.887) (0.801) (0.743)
Pricing 18.853 5.115 -0.062 6.375* 0.236 -1.434*
(12.245) (16.079) (16.268) (3.039) (0.936) (0.721)
Day of study trend -1.115** -1.703** -1.715** 0.099 -0.006 -0.081**
(0.397) (0.539) (0.542) (0.102) (0.026) (0.027)
Pricing x Day-of-study trend 0.921 0.864 0.033 -0.022 0.046
(0.640) (0.647) (0.102) (0.032) (0.046)
Info x Day-of-study trend 0.957 0.900 -0.090 0.006 0.040
(0.638) (0.642) (0.104) (0.030) (0.040)
Adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.012
N 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the external cost
of transport (in cents per day), aggregated to the person-day level, and restricted to study
days 1-28 (pre-treatment). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the partici-
pant level. The regressions additionally include calendar day FE.
Strategic mode corrections
One possible explanation for the trend discussed in the previous section is a strategic
correction of modes. Participants were invited to use the validation interface to confirm
the detected mode and purpose of their trips and activities. As the mode is crucial in
determining the external costs, the possibility of over-writing the detected mode provided
an opportunity for the participants in the pricing group to “game” the experiment, e.g.,
by mis-assigning actual car trips to another transport mode.
On the other hand, mode adjustments could also be true corrections of a wrongly de-
tected mode. The key question is therefore whether we observe a systematically different
mode correction behavior for the pricing group relative to the control and information
groups. To test for this, we regress the number of daily mode corrections during the treat-
ment phase on dummies indicating membership in the pricing and information groups,
while controlling for day of sample and day of calendar day FE. We focus on the treatment
phase because there was no incentive to act strategically during the observation period.
The results are shown in column 1 of Table 10. We see no difference in the number of cor-
rections per day across groups, and the results remain stable if we add a series of control
variables (column 2).19 Columns 3-4 show the marginal effects of a logit regression, using
the same explanatory variable but with a dummy that is equal to one if a person has
19These are the variables for which we compute the interaction terms in section 5.3.
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corrected a mode on a given day, and zero otherwise. We find no differential correction
on the extensive margin.
Table 10: Mode Correction
Corrections Corrections Probability (Corr.) Probability (Corr.)
Pricing 1.024 1.009 0.002 0.0003
(0.066) (0.065) (0.006) (0.007)
Information 0.981 0.976 0.000 -0.001
(0.063) (0.063) (0.007) (0.007)
Controls  X  X
N 74,899 72,759 74,858 72,718
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at participant level. The dependent variable in the first two columns
is the number of mode corrections per day. The coefficients are proportional
effects, estimated using a ppml model. Columns 3-4 display the marginal effects
from logit regressions. All regressions control for calendar and study day FE.
To further test the robustness of our results, we re-run our base regression after remov-
ing all observations (on the person-day-level) that contain at least one mode correction
(this removes 9.4% of the data in phase 2). The resulting treatment effects, proportional
effects and elasticities are shown in column 2 of Table 11, along with the baseline results.
Although the point estimates change somewhat due to the different sample, the effects
remain largely stable. This implies that our results are unlikely to be driven by strategic
mode correction.
Self-selection due to nonrandom attrition
The assignment into groups was randomized, but people chose whether or not they wanted
to continue with the study. If people in the pricing group were more or less likely to drop
out of the study than the control group, this could lead to a bias due to self-selection. We
address this issue in detail in Appendix B.8, where we investigate participant retention
and find no differential attrition across groups.
Furthermore, if attrition were influenced by the group assignment, any bias due to
self-selection should increase over the course of the treatment phase. We therefore re-
estimate our base model using only the first two weeks (column 3 of Table 11) or the last
two weeks of the treatment period (column 4). The results remain largely unchanged,
indicating that nonrandom attrition is unlikely to be an important source of bias.
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Table 11: Subsample analyses
Baseline w/o corrections w/o weeks 7-8 w/o weeks 5-6 w/o zeroes
Pricing -0.215** -0.237** -0.234** -0.228** -0.216**
(0.072) (0.080) (0.082) (0.086) (0.074)
Information -0.087 -0.075 -0.080 -0.092 -0.091
(0.069) (0.078) (0.081) (0.084) (0.071)
Constant 4.462** 4.711** 4.527** 4.486** 4.664**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
Prop. effect -0.051 -0.054 -0.055 -0.049 -0.053
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017)
Elasticity -0.310 -0.329 -0.339 -0.300 -0.324
(0.103) (0.109) (0.116) (0.126) (0.103)
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
Adj.R2 0.232 0.238 0.235 0.232 0.238
N 161,208 139,703 121,311 122,977 154,520
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and
clustered at participant level. All regressions include fixed effects for person, day of
study and day of calendar. The proportional effect and the elasticity are computed
using the averages of the control group subject to the appropriate restrictions.
Treatment of missing tracking data
Many participants did not deliver tracks on all days. To differentiate between true zeroes
(i.e., participants staying at home) and missings (participants disabling the app), we rely
on imputed activities. Suppose that a participant travels home on Friday evening and
does not deliver another track until Monday. If the app (and our algorithm) impute an
uninterrupted activity “at home” that spans the trips on Friday and Monday, then we
assume that this person stayed at home and assign a travel distance of zero. However,
the imputation of activities is not always correct. To gauge the sensitivity or our results
to the issue of missings vs. zeroes, we re-estimate the model using only data from days
with nonzero travel distances. The resulting ATE is shown in column 5 of Table 11. Due
to the exclusion of zero-travel days, the average daily external cost increases, and the
proportional effect and the elasticity therefore decrease somewhat, but the results are
overall quite stable.
6 Conclusion
The MOBIS experiment implemented transport pricing based on the social marginal costs.
The external health costs were the most important, followed by congestion and climate
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costs. The short-term elasticity for total external costs associated with the pricing treat-
ment was -0.31. Whereas the information-only treatment had an effect for subgroups of
the population (such as altruists), the effect is not statistically significant for the sample
overall. The reduction in the external costs is due to a combination of a shift away from
driving towards other modes and towards less congested times and routes. The effect
varies with gender, age, income, household size and language region, and also with the
degree to which participants engaged with the experiment.
The elasticity estimate is comparable to results based on toll pricing (Bain, 2019), but
lower than earlier estimates based on before-vs.-after studies (Leape, 2006; Nielsen, 2004).
The MOBIS experiment is the first multi-modal RCT about pricing in a transport setting
and thus different to uni-modal pricing schemes, where the lack of pricing for alternative
modes may have inflated the mode shift effect of the pricing scheme.
Drivers were over-represented in this study by design. As driving produces the largest
external costs, the observed short-term elasticity therefore may lead to over-estimating
pricing effects in the overall population. Furthermore, since the pricing scheme in the
experiment consisted of taking money away from a given budget, loss aversion may have
increased the effect relative to a tax (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). On the other hand,
there are a number of arguments for expecting larger effects in the long run. With a per-
manent introduction of transport pricing, additional margins of response would become
available such as the choice of work and home locations, changes in activity routines,
vehicle/transit pass ownership or negotiations with employers about work hours and lo-
cation. Furthermore, the behavioral response was concentrated among those respondents
that understood the concept of external costs underlying the experiment. Whereas it is
to be expected that not everyone pays close attention to the “rules” in a short study, a
general introduction of transport pricing would presumably have a greater salience.
Our experiment shows that multi-modal transport pricing works in practice. The
required technology is available, and a number countries have computed the external
costs of mobility within their borders. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that
patterns of living, working and traveling are more adjustable than previously assumed. It
seems justified to expect people to respond to the price incentives in similar, albeit less
dramatic ways. Furthermore, a transition away from the current transport funding that
relies mostly on fuel taxes is unavoidable due to shifts in modes, fuel types and vehicle
technologies. Pigovian transport pricing is an alternative funding mechanism that can
also be implemented in the presence of a sizeable electric vehicle fleet.
A Pigovian pricing scheme as used in the MOBIS experiment would face a number
of challenges for practical implementation due to privacy concerns, limited social accept-
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ability and the technical constraints of assessing the tax on a real-time basis (including
an update of the congestion costs, which will change if pricing leads to significant peak
shifting). However, even a simplified pricing scheme should be guided by the marginal ex-
ternal costs of transport to increase the efficiency of the transport system. A key challenge
will be to agree on the price setting (e.g., the value of time or the social cost of carbon)
within the political process. Furthermore, it is well-known that fuel taxes are regressive
(West and Williams, 2004; Bento et al., 2009), and the distributional aspects of a cost-
based pricing scheme like the one used here thus deserve further investigation. Efforts
to advance such a scheme will need to be complemented with re-distributive measures to
counteract adverse distributional implications.
Multi-modal transport pricing based on the external costs of transport is feasible and
has the desired effect of shifting modes, departure times and routes. It thus leads to
a more efficient use of the transport system and a reduction in the need for network
expansions. If implemented in an equitable way, transport pricing could become a key
pillar of sustainable transport policy.
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Götschi, Thomas, and Beat Hintermann. 2014. “Valuing public investments to sup-
port bicycling.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 150(4): 297–329.
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Online Appendix
A Additional tables and figures
Figure A.1: How revenue from transport pricing should be used.
Notes: Based on question: “If dynamic mobility pricing (i.e., prices depending on mode, route
and time) were introduced, what should be done with the revenue?”.
40
Figure A.2: Event study graph
Note: These event study graphs show the effect of pricing plus information (top) and
information only (bottom) per study day. These are the coefficients on the interaction terms
involving the study day and the treatment dummies. The effects are shown relative to the
first three weeks, which is normalized to zero. The bars show 95% confidence intervals. Study
day 29 has been removed, making day 30 the first in the treatment period.
41
Figure A.3: Treatment effect for car travel and public transport
Note: The figure shows the proportional Average Treatment Effect for driving (left) and
public transport (right). For additional notes, see Fig. 6 in the main text.
42
Figure A.4: Distribution of conditional effects
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the conditional treatment effects resulting from
the causal forest approach for total external costs and the individual cost dimensions
considered.
43
Figure A.5: Variable importance in Causal Forest
Notes: The figure shows the variable importance measure from the causal forest approach,
relative to the “most important” variable which differs across the cost dimensions considered.
The top left panel shows the conditional treatment effects on total external costs, and the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Effect for car and public transport
(a) Car
Total External Cost Health Costs Climate Costs Congestion Costs
Pricing -0.223** -0.224** -0.117** -0.037* -0.069**
(0.072) (0.074) (0.045) (0.017) (0.021)
Information -0.110 -0.113 -0.062 -0.020 -0.028
(0.069) (0.069) (0.044) (0.016) (0.020)
Difference -0.113 -0.111 -0.056 -0.017 -0.040*







Adj. R2 0.238 0.239 0.229 0.223 0.274
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) Public Transport
Total External Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing 0.011 0.011 0.011* 0.002 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.001) (0.010)
Information 0.023’ 0.023’ 0.016** 0.001 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009)
Difference -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 0.001 -0.008







Adj. R2 0.286 0.286 0.235 0.137 0.274
Cluster 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 168,208 168,208 168,208 168,208 168,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
participant level. The dependent variable contains the external costs of transport aggregated
to the person-day level (in CHF). Difference is the differential effect between the Pricing and
the Information groups. All regressions include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Table A.3: Effect heterogeneity: Gender and Education
(a) Gender
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.121 -0.079 -0.028 -0.014
(0.081) (0.051) (0.019) (0.026)
Information -0.004 -0.035 -0.004 0.035
(0.077) (0.049) (0.018) (0.024)
Pricing x male -0.189’ -0.059 -0.016 -0.114**
(0.104) (0.064) (0.024) (0.032)
Inf. x male -0.165’ -0.022 -0.029 -0.114**
(0.097) (0.061) (0.022) (0.029)
Pricing + Pr. x male -0.311** -0.138* -0.044* -0.128**
(0.096) (0.059) (0.022) (0.030)
Inf. + Inf. x male -0.169’ -0.057 -0.033 -0.079*
(0.091) (0.057) (0.021) (0.028)
Pricing - Inf. -0.117 -0.045 -0.023 -0.049’
(0.088) (0.055) (0.020) (0.027)
(Pricing + Pr. x male)
- (Inf. + Inf. x male)
-0.141 -0.082 -0.010 -0.049
(0.112) (0.069) (0.026) (0.035)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.269
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) Education
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.182* -0.080 -0.031 -0.071**
(0.087) (0.054) (0.022) (0.027)
Information -0.037 -0.018 -0.001 -0.017
(0.083) (0.052) (0.019) (0.026)
Pricing x tertiary educ. -0.073 -0.063 -0.010 0.000
(0.104) (0.064) (0.024) (0.033)
Inf. x tertiary educ. -0.012 -0.060 -0.041’ 0.011
(0.97) (0.061) (0.022) (0.030)
Pricing + Pr. x tertiary educ. -0.255** -0.143* -0.041* -0.070*
(0.089) (0.056) (0.020) (0.029)
Inf. + Inf. x tertiary educ. -0.148’ -0.079 -0.041* -0.028
(0.086) (0.054) (0.020) (0.027)
Pricing - Inf. -0.146 -0.062 -0.030 -0.053’
(0.099) (0.061) (0.023) (0.030)
(Pricing + Pr. x tertiary educ.)
- (Inf. + Inf. x tertiary educ.)
-0.107 -0.065 0.000 -0.042
(0.103) (0.064) (0.023) (0.033)
Constant 4.462** 2.587** 0.887** 1.003**
(0.020) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006)
Adj. R2 0.221 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external
costs of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the participant level. The dummy variable “male” is equal to one for
men. The dummy “tertiary educ.” is equal to one for those that have a tertiary education,
and zero otherwise. All regressions include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Table A.4: Effect heterogeneity: Age
Total ext. costs Health costs Climate costs Congestion costs
Pricing -0.110’ -0.046 -0.004 -0.060*
(0.084) (0.053) (0.019) (0.026)
Information -0.122 -0.055 -0.026 -0.041
(0.081) (0.051) (0.018) (0.025)
Pricing x old -0.185 -0.096 -0.063’ 0.026
(0.145) (0.086) (0.033) (0.049)
Inf. x old -0.059 -0.066 -0.014 0.020
(0.137) (0.084) (0.032) (0.038)
Pricing x young -0.261 -0.166* -0.075** -0.020
(0.122) (0.076) (0.028) (0.037)
Inf. x young 0.175 0.082 0.035 0.058
(0.112) (0.071) (0.026) (0.036)
Pricing + Pr. x old -0.295* -0.142’ -0.067* -0.087’
(0.137) (0.081) (0.031) (0.047)
Inf. + Inf. x old -0.181 -0.120 -0.039 -0.022
(0.130) (0.080) (0.030) (0.036)
Pricing + Pricing x young -0.371** -0.212** -0.079** -0.080*
(0.113) (0.070) (0.026) (0.035)
Inf. + Inf. x young 0.053 0.027 0.010 0.016
(0.104) (0.066) (0.024) (0.034)
Pricing - Inf. 0.112 0.008 0.022 -0.019
(0.094) (0.059) (0.022) (0.029)
(Pricing + Pr. x old)
- (Inf. + Inf. x old)
-0.114 -0.022 -0.027 -0.051
(0.175) (0.105) (0.041) (0.0555)
(Pricing + Pr. x young)
- (Inf. + Inf. x young)
-0.424** -0.239** -0.088** -0.096*
(0.137) (0.085) (0.032) (0.043)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.26
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the exter-
nal costs of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the participant level. The reference category is the age group
30-54. The dummy “young” is equal to one for people less than 30 years, and the dummy
“old” is equal to one for people that are 50 or older (and zero otherwise). All regressions
include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Table A.5: Effect heterogeneity: Income
Total ext. costs Health costs Climate costs Congestion costs
Pricing -0.259** -0.135* -0.049* -0.076*
(0.095) (0.059) (0.021) (0.031)
Information -0.070 -0.025 -0.009 -0.036
(0.069) (0.058) (0.021) (0.029)
Pricing x high inc. -0.069 0.000 0.002 -0.071
(0.135) (0.081) (0.032) (0.045)
Inf. x high inc. -0.048 -0.011 -0.035 0.002
(0.129) (0.081) (0.030) (0.040)
Pricing x low inc. 0.177 0.075 0.036 0.066’
(0.119) (0.075) (0.027) (0.035)
Inf. x low inc. -0.016 -0.047 -0.006 0.037
(0.110) (0.069) (0.025) (0.033)
Pricing + Pr. x high inc. -0.328** -0.134’ -0.046 -0.147**
(0.118) (0.071) (0.029) (0.040)
Inf. + Inf. x high inc -0.118 -0.036 -0.044 -0.038
(0.115) (0.072) (0.027) (0.036)
Pricing + Pr. x low inc. -0.082 -0.059 -0.013 -0.010
(0.100) (0.064) (0.023) (0.028)
Inf. + Inf. x low inc -0.086 -0.073 -0.015 0.001
(0.092) (0.057) (0.021) (0.028)
Pricing - Inf. -0.189’ -0.109 -0.040 -0.040
(0.112) (0.070) (0.025) (0.036)
(Pricing + Pr. x high inc.)
- (Inf. + Inf. x high inc.)
-0.209 -0.098 -0.002 -0.109*
(0.149) (0.091) (0.036) (0.049)
(Pricing + Pr. x low inc.)
- (Inf. + Inf. x low inc.)
0.004 0.013 0.002 -0.011
(0.117) (0.073) (0.027) (0.032)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external
costs of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the participant level. The reference category is given by a house-
hold income between CHF 8,000 and 12,000 per month. “high inc.” and “low inc.” are
dummy variables denoting respondents that reported a monthly household income of above
CHF 12,000 and below CHF 8,000, respectively. All regressions include individual, calendar
day and day of study FE.
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Table A.6: Effect heterogeneity: Household size
Total ext. costs Health costs Climate costs Congestion costs
Pricing -0.135 -0.084 -0.011 -0.041
(0.086) (0.053) (0.019) (0.027)
Information -0.082 -0.051 -0.012 -0.019
(0.084) (0.053) (0.019) (0.026)
Pricing x large size -0.293 -0.188 -0.108* 0.002
(0.182) (0.114) (0.042) (0.046)
Inf. x large size 0.265 0.165 0.049 0.051
(0.182) (0.106) (0.049) (0.051)
Pricing x small size -0.125 -0.015 -0.035 -0.074*
(0.111) (0.068) (0.026) (0.036)
Inf. x small size -0.065 -0.020 -0.027 -0.018
(0.102) (0.064) (0.023) (0.032)
Pricing + Pr. x large size -0.429* -0.272* -0.119** -0.038
(0.175) (0.110) (0.041) (0.044)
Inf. + Inf. x large size 0.183 0.114 0.037 0.032
(0.176) (0.102) (0.048) (0.049)
Pricing + Pr. x small size -0.260** -0.099 -0.046* -0.114**
(0.099) (0.064) (0.023) (0.032)
Inf. + Inf. x small size -0.147 -0.071 -0.039’ -0.037
(0.090) (0.059) (0.021) (0.028)
Pricing - Inf. -0.053 -0.033 0.001 -0.021
(0.098) (0.061) (0.022) (0.030)
(Pricing + Pr. x large size)
- (Inf. + Inf. x large size)
-0.612* -0.386** -0.156* -0.070
(0.238) (0.144) (0.061) (0.062)
(Pricing + Pr. x small size)
- (Inf. + Inf. x small size)
-0.113 -0.028 -0.007 -0.078*
(0.115) (0.071) (0.027) (0.036)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external
costs of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the participant level. The reference category is a household size with
3 or 4 persons. Participants living in households with fewer than 3 persons are denoted by
the dummy “small size”, and those living in households with 5 or more persons are denoted
by “large size”. All regressions include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Table A.7: Heterogeneity: Attention to experiment
(a) Awareness of experimental rules
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.204’ -0.083 -0.031 -0.089*
(0.111) (0.067) (0.025) (0.037)
Information 0.003 0.015 0.007 -0.019
(0.097) (0.060) (0.022) (0.030)
Pricing x aware -0.016 -0.037 -0.006 0.027
(0.117) (0.070) (0.027) (0.038)
Inf. x aware -0.149 -0.101 -0.043’ -0.006
(0.102) (0.064) (0.023) (0.031)
Pricing + Pr. x aware -0.220** -0.120** -0.037* -0.062**
(0.078) (0.049) (0.018) (0.024)
Information + Inf. x aware -0.146’ -0.085’ -0.036* -0.025
(0.077) (0.048) (0.018) (0.024)
Constant 4.462** 2.587** 0.872** 1.003**
(0.020) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) Correct answer to externalities question
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.027 0.006 0.005 -0.038
(0.083) (0.052) (0.019) (0.026)
Information -0.045 -0.018 -0.003 -0.024
(0.085) (0.053) (0.020) (0.026)
Pricing x correct -0.481** -0.296** -0.103** -0.083*
(0.107) (0.066) (0.025) (0.034)
Inf. x correct -0.099 -0.060 -0.036 0.003
(0.098) (0.061) (0.022) (0.030)
Pricing + Pr. x correct -0.509** -0.289** -0.098** -0.121**
(0.098) (0.060) (0.023) (0.031)
Inf. + Inf. x correct -0.144’ -0.077 -0.039* -0.027
(0.085) (0.054) (0.020) (0.027)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.224 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,486 3,486 3,486 3,486
N 155,517 155,517 155,517 155,517
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external costs
of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the participant level. The dummy “aware” is equal to one for those participants that
reported in the final survey that they were aware that they could make money or reduce their ex-
ternal costs of travel by changing their travel patterns. The dummy “correct” is equal to one for
those participants that correctly selected the definition of the external costs of transport among
four presented options, and zero otherwise.
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Table A.8: Heterogeneity: Intrinsic values (1/2)
(a) “Egoistic” score
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.237* -0.136* -0.050* -0.050
(0.098) (0.060) (0.023) (0.031)
Information -0.048 -0.027 -0.001 -0.022
(0.096) (0.061) (0.022) (0.029)
Pricing x egoistic 0.035 0.044 0.023 -0.032
(0.107) (0.066) (0.025) (0.034)
Inf. x egoistic -0.060 -0.029 -0.030 -0.001
(0.102) (0.064) (0.023) (0.031)
Pricing + Pr. x egoistic -0.202* -0.092’ -0.027’ -0.082**
(0.083) (0.052) (0.019) (0.026)
Information + Inf. x egoistic -0.108 -0.056 -0.029’ -0.023
(0.078) (0.049) (0.018) (0.024)
Pricing - Inf. -0.189 -0.110 -0.051’ -0.028
(0.118) (0.073) (0.027) (0.036)
(Pricing + Pr. x egoistic)
- (Inf. + Inf. x egoistic)
-0.094 -0.037 0.002 -0.060*
(0.090) (0.056) (0.021) (0.028)
Constant 4.462** 2.587** 0.872** 1.003**
(0.020) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
Adj. R2 0.221 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) “Hedonic” score
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.292** -0.150* -0.050* -0.093**
(0.1041) (0.061) (0.023) (0.033)
Information -0.044 -0.041 -0.017 0.013
(0.094) (0.060) (0.021) (0.028)
Pricing x hedonic 0.128 0.068 0.023 0.037
(0.109) (0.068) (0.025) (0.035)
Inf. x hedonic -0.069 -0.008 -0.004 -0.057’
(0.101) (0.064) (0.023) (0.030)
Pricing + Pr. x hedonic -0.164* -0.081 -0.026 -0.056*
(0.081) (0.019) (0.064) (0.024)
Inf. + Inf. x hedonic -0.113 -0.049 -0.020 -0.044’
(0.078) (0.049) (0.018) (0.025)
Pricing - Inf. -0.248* -0.109 -0.033 -0.106**
(0.119) (0.073) (0.027) (0.038)
(Pricing + Pr. x hedonic)
- (Inf. + Inf. x hedonic)
-0.051 -0.032 -0.006 -0.012
(0.088) (0.055) (0.021) (0.027)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external costs
of transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at participant level. Based on a battery of 16 values-related questions, participants were
given an index among the dimensions “altruistic”, “hedonic”, “egoistic” and “biospheric”. The
dummies ”egoistic” and ”hedonic” denote participants with an above-median value for these two
dimensions.
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Table A.9: Heterogeneity: Intrinsic values (2/2)
(a) “Altruistic” score
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.157 -0.065 -0.020 -0.072*
(0.097) (0.061) (0.022) (0.031)
Information 0.021 0.018 -0.001 0.002
(0.098) (0.063) (0.022) (0.028)
Pricing x altruistic -0.093 -0.070 -0.025 0.002
(0.107) (0.066) (0.025) (0.034)
Inf. x altruistic -0.167 -0.098 -0.031 -0.038
(0.103) (0.065) (0.024) (0.030)
Pricing + Pr. x altruistic -0.250** -0.135** -0.045* -0.070**
(0.083) (0.051) (0.019) (0.026)
Information + Inf. x altruistic -0.146’ -0.080’ -0.030’ -0.036
(0.077) (0.048) (0.018) (0.025)
Pricing - Inf. -0.178 -0.083 -0.021 -0.074*
(0.119) (0.075) (0.027) (0.036)
(Pricing + Pr. x altruistic)
- (Inf. + Inf. x altruistic)
-0.104 -0.055 -0.015 -0.034
(0.089) (0.055) (0.021) (0.028)
Constant 4.462** 2.587** 0.872** 1.003**
(0.020) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) “Biospheric” score
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.179’ -0.077’ -0.023 -0.078**
(0.099) (0.063) (0.023) (0.030)
Information -0.0084 -0.042 -0.022 -0.020
(0.105) (0.067) (0.024) (0.030)
Pricing x bio -0.057 -0.050 -0.020 0.012
(0.108) (0.067) (0.025) (0.033)
Inf. x bio -0.005 -0.005 -0.043* -0.004
(0.109) (0.068) (0.019) (0.032)
Pricing + Pr. x bio -0.236** -0.127* -0.018 -0.0566*
(0.082) (0.050) (0.019) (0.026)
Information + Inf. x bio -0.089 -0.047 -0.021 -0.024
(0.075) (0.047) (0.017) (0.024)
Pricing - Inf. -0.095 -0.035 -0.002 -0.059
(0.126) (0.080) (0.029) (0.036)
(Pricing + Pr. x bio)
- (Inf. + Inf. x Bio)
-0.147’ -0.080 -0.025 -0.042
(0.087) (0.053) (0.020) (0.028)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external costs of
transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the participant level. Based on a battery of 16 values-related questions, participants were
given an index among the dimensions “altruistic”, “hedonic”, “egoistic” and “biospheric”. The
dummies ”altruistic” and ”biospheric” denote participants with an above-median value for these
dimensions. All regressions include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Table A.10: Heterogeneity: Language and day of week
(a) Language
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.286** -0.145** -0.048** -0.093**
(0.079) (0.049) (0.018) (0.025)
Information -0.079 -0.033 -0.015 -0.031
(0.077) (0.048) (0.018) (0.024)
Pricing x French 0.273* 0.142* 0.046’ 0.085*
(0.111) (0.070) (0.025) (0.035)
Inf. x French -0.030 -0.047 -0.014 0.032
(0.102) (0.066) (0.024) (0.030)
Pricing + Pr. x French -0.013 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008
(0.104) (0.067) (0.023) (0.033)
Information + Inf. x French -0.109 -0.082 -0.029 0.001
(0.097) (0.063) (0.022) (0.028)
Pricing - Inf. -0.206* -0.112* -0.032 -0.062*
(0.086) (0.052) (0.020) (0.027)
(Pricing - Pr. x French)
- (Inf. - Inf. x French)
0.096 0.076 0.028 -0.009
(0.124) (0.081) (0.028) (0.038)
Constant 4.462** 2.587** 0.882** 1.003**
(0.020) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006)
Adj. R2 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
(b) Weekend
Total Ext. Cost Health Cost Climate Cost Congestion Cost
Pricing -0.251** -0.126** -0.047** -0.078**
(0.077) (0.048) (0.018) (0.024)
Information -0.137’ -0.070 -0.024 -0.043’
(0.075) (0.047) (0.017) (0.024)
Pricing x weekend 0.125 0.059 0.040 0.026
(0.120) (0.076) (0.026) (0.034)
Inf. x weekend 0.172 0.083 0.017 0.071*
(0.116) (0.073) (0.025) (0.036)
Pricing + Pr. x weekend -0.126 -0.067 -0.007 -0.052
(0.115) (0.073) (0.026) (0.034)
Inf + Inf x weekend 0.034 -0.013 -0.007 0.028
(0.111) (0.070) (0.024) (0.034)
Pricing - Inf. -0.113 -0.055 -0.023 -0.035
(0.078) (0.049) (0.018) (0.024)
(Pricing + Pr. x weekend)
- (Inf. + Inf. x weekend)
-0.160 -0.080 0.000 -0.080*
(0.133) (0.084) (0.029) (0.039)
Adj R2 0.222 0.225 0.221 0.268
Clusters 3,656 3,656 3,656 3,656
N 161,208 161,208 161,208 161,208
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the external costs of
transport aggregated to the person-day level (in CHF). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the participant level. The reference category are German speakers or those that chose En-
glish as their preferred language. The dummy variable “French” is equal to one for French speak-
ers. The weekend dummy is equal to one for week-ends and holidays, and zero otherwise. All re-
gressions include individual, calendar day and day of study FE.
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Pricing 0.986 0.957* 1.062 1.133 1.039*
(0.015) (0.017) (3) (0.087) (0.018)
Information 1.010 0.973 1.136** 1.061 1.014
(0.015) (0.017) (0.045) (0.075) (0.018)
Difference 0.976’ 0.983 0.935’ 1.068 1.025
(0.014) (0.017) (0.034) (0.084) (0.018)
Precipitation 0.998* 1.000 0.992** 0.978** 0.994
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Heat 1.046** 1.059** 1.004 1.051** 1.026**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017) (0.004)
Cold 0.860** 0.826** 0.930 0.903’ 0.943**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.046) (0.053) (0.017)
Constant 45,442.6** 33,894.1** 22,839.2** 2,975.3** 2,086.7**
(818.166) (707.771) (1,054.363) (201.647 (40.978)
Adj. R2 0.273 0.299 0.416 0.471 0.263
Clusters 3,656 3,653 3,525 2,186 3,655
N 161,208 161,139 155,765 97,342 161,201
(b) Intensive margin
Total Car Public Transport Bicycle Walking
Pricing 0.986 0.973’ 1.025 0.989 1.040*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.037) (0.052) (0.017)
Information 1.009 0.986 1.093* 1.001 1.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.040) (0.048) (0.017)
Difference 0.977 0.987 0.938’ 0.988 1.025
(0.014) (0.016) (0.032) (0.056) (0.017)
Precipitation 0.999 1.000 0.997 0.999 0.995**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Heat 1.047** 1.064** 1.023* 1.026** 1.029**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Cold 0.857** 0.845** 0.943 0.945 0.941**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.041) (0.042) (0.016)
Adj. R2 0.280 0.298 0.486 0.647 0.261
Clusters 3,656 3,651 3,373 1,541 3,654
N 154,520 125,452 55,889 12,645 135,651
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable contains the distance trav-
eled aggregated to the person-day level either including zeroes (panel a) or restricted to positive
observations (panel b). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the participant level. The
coefficients were estimated using a PPML model and then exponentiated to derive proportional ef-
fects (with 1.00 representing no effect). All regressions include individual, calendar day and day of
study FE.
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Table A.12: ATE on mode distance share and congestion per km
(a) Mode Distance Share
Car Public transport Bicycle Walking
Pricing 0.969** 1.047* 1.178* 1.048’
(0.008) (0.024) (0.080) (0.027)
Information 0.983* 1.045* 1.067 1.017
(0.007) (0.022) (0.067) (0.025)
Difference 0.986’ 1.001 1.104 1.031
(0.008) (0.021) (0.076) (0.026)
Precipitation 1.002** 0.995** 0.980** 0.996*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Heat 1.005* 0.969** 0.993 1.015*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)
Cold 0.969** 1.033 0.979 1.019
(0.010) (0.023) (0.042) (0.021)
Adj. R2 0.056 0.201 0.303 0.121
Clusters 3,653 3,525 2,186 3,655
N 154,483 149,507 93,927 154,518
(b) Congestion per km
Congestion (car) Congestion (PT) Speed (car) Speed (PT)
Pricing 0.930** 0.977 1.001 1.010
(0.019) (0.040) (0.006) (0.013)
Information 0.955* 0.950 1.001 1.023’
(0.020) (0.040) (0.006) (0.013)
Difference 0.974 1.028 1.000 0.986
(0.020) (0.041) (0.006) (0.012)
Precipitation 0.999 0.997 0.999’ 0.999
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Heat 0.950** 0.948** 1.017** 1.007*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003)
Cold 1.073** 1.077 0.960** 0.996
(0.028) (0.059) (0.008) (0.015)
Adj. R2 0.028 0.038 0.189 0.294
Clusters 3,651 2,517 3,651 3,373
N 125,452 48,295 125,453 55,889
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
participant level.
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Table A.13: ATE on probability to travel (extensive margin)
Total travel Car Public Transport Bicycling Walking
Pricing 1.000 0.970** 1.062* 1.133* 1.006
(0.005) (0.010) (0.027) (0.070) (0.008)
Infomation 0.998 0.980* 1.047’ 1.011 1.004
(0.005) (0.009) (0.025) (0.059) (0.007)
Difference 1.002 0.990 1.014 1.121’ 1.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.026) (0.072) (0.008)
N 101,787 151,263 155,620 97,342 151,458
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors in paren-
theses and clustered at participant level. The coefficients in the table are
marginal effects in the form of semi-elasticities (dlny/dx) after estimat-
ing a logit regression that includes the weather variables and a series of
dummies to capture person, day of study and calendar day FE effects.
Table A.14: ATE on departure time for car trips
Overall Morning Evening
Pricing 0.381 -4.680* 1.850
(2.525) (1.964) (2.181)
Info post -3.179 -1.745 -0.083
(2.499) (1.989) (2.207)
Difference 3.560 -2.934 1.933
(2.528) (2.096) (2.242)
Adj. R2 0.054 0.204 0.116
Clusters 2,886 2,885 2,886
N 285,077 102,410 182,665
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
at participant level. The regressions include observations from participants that
travelled at least once by car in the morning peak (departure between 6:30 and 8:30)
and the evening peak (departure between 16:30 and 18:30) during the observation
period. In column 1, all trips were combined, whereas columns 2 and 3 focus on
departure before or after noon, respectively. All regressions include day of calendar, day
of study and person fixed effects.
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Table A.15: Trends in distance travelled
All Travel All Travel Car PT Bicycle Walking
Info 0.099 0.242 -0.093 0.291 -0.067 0.111’
(1.107) (1.461) (1.329) (0.835) (0.115) (0.067)
Pricing 2.456* 2.546’ 0.694 1.689’ 0.034 0.129*
(1.133) (1.510) (1.348) (0.908) (0.134) (0.065)
Study Day 0.042 0.027 -0.046 0.066* -0.001 0.007*
(0.038) (0.053) (0.046) (0.032) (0.004) (0.002)
Pricing x Study Day -0.006 0.012 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004
(0.063) (0.055) (0.037) (0.005) (0.003)
Info x Study Day 0.051 0.066 -0.013 0.001 -0.004
(0.063) (0.055) (0.037) (0.004) (0.003)
Calendar day FE X X X X X X
Adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.012
N 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081 83,081
Notes: **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05, ’: p < 0.1. The dependent variable the travel
distance (in km), aggregated to the person-day level. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the participant level.
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B The MOBIS study: Step by step
In this section, we describe the study in more detail.
B.1 Sample size
In order to determine the appropriate sample size of the experiment, we carried out a series
of power calculations by means of simulation. In panel data, autocorrelation is a design
feature, which we also observe in our data (i.e., a particular respondent makes similar
travel choices over time). The presence of autocorrelation implies that the standard
formulae for power calculations, e.g. as in Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2007), are
biased (Burlig, Preonas and Woerman, 2020). Computing the power of an experiment
based on simulations addresses this problem as it uses the empirical correlation structure
in the data.
We based our power calculations on data from two earlier transport studies carried
out by ETH-IVT.20 We imposed a significance level of p=0.05, a power of 0.8 and an
effect size of 5%. Given these settings, the power calculations indicated that we needed
a sample size of around 1,100 for each group (treatment and control). Given that we
have two treatment groups, this led to a target sample size of 3,300 for our study. To
ensure that this sample size was attained even after removing respondents who did not
participate on a sufficient number of days or who had to be excluded for other reasons,
we set a recruitment goal of 3,600 people. Once we attained this number, recruitment
was stopped.
B.2 Invitation
Assuming a participation rate in the main study similar to the one observed in the pilot
study (i.e. 3.4%), approximately 100,000 addresses were expected to be required to achieve
the goal of 3,400 participants. Ultimately, 90,909 persons were invited to participate in
the MOBIS study. The invitation letters were sent in two waves by regular mail.
The first wave started in July 2019. 60,409 persons were contacted using home ad-
dresses provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS in German). Only persons
aged 18 to 65 in 2018 and living in an agglomeration of the German- and French-speaking
Swiss cantons were invited. The persons who did not react after the first invitation letter
20The 6-weeks MOBIDrive (Axhausen et al., 2002) and the 6 week-Thurgau survey (Axhausen
et al., 2007).
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received up to two reminders (a second and third invitation letter). The time lag between
the invitation letter and the reminders was between 3 and 4 weeks.
The second wave was invited in October 2019. 30,500 additional persons were con-
tacted using home addresses purchased from the private vendor Schober Information
Group AG. The persons of the second wave only received a single invitation letter, i.e.,
no reminder was sent. 56 persons in the second wave accidentally received a duplicated
participant ID which had already been allocated to participants in the first wave. These
persons were informed that despite the invitation, they could not participate in the study.
The invitation letter was written in German, French and English. The front side
of the invitation showed the German or the French version, while the back side always
showed the English version. The language of the front side was assigned based on the
communication language, which was provided in the list of addresses. In case of Italian
speaking persons, the main spoken language of their home canton was assigned.
The content of the invitation was the same for all languages. The letter explained the
background of the study (rationale, participating universities and supporting institutions)
and provided instructions for completing the online introduction survey and registration.
No reference to an experiment was made. The participant ID (a five-letter code) was
provided in these instructions. This ID enabled the access to the introduction survey,
registration and final survey. Finally, the letter informed about the financial reward for
complete participation and about the data privacy policy.
B.3 Introduction survey
The invited persons who were willing to participate in the MOBIS study first had to fill
out an online introduction survey. This survey had two goals: First, to collect transport-
related opinion from the general population, and second, to identify subjects who qualified
for the main study based on the following inclusion criteria:
• Be the recipient of the personal invitation letter (the invitation was not transferable
to other persons)
• Live in a metropolitan area in the German- or French-speaking part of Switzerland
(the lists of addresses included only people living in these areas but the survey
double-checked the post code)
• Be between 18 and 65 years old in 2018 (the list of addresses provided by the BFS
was pre-filtered by age at this year)
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• Travel by car at least two weekdays per week (including their own car, car-sharing
as a driver, or with a taxi and App-based services such as Uber as passenger)
• Use a smartphone that can install the tracking app
• To be able to walk 200 meter without assistance (to ensure that participants have
free mode choice)
• Not work as a professional driver (to ensure that participants have free mode choice)
People meeting the above listed inclusion criteria were invited to register for the field
experiment of the MOBIS study by clicking on a web link embedded at the end of the
introduction survey survey. Beyond the questions related to the aforementioned inclusion
criteria, the introduction survey contained questions related to transport-related topics,
but without making reference to an experiment.
The introduction survey was accessible online through the survey platform Qualtrics.
B.4 Tracking
People who completed the introduction survey, met the inclusion criteria and accepted
to participate in the tracking study were sent forward to the registration (survey), which
was also accessible online through Qualtrics. The registration had as a goal to confirm the
acceptance of the conditions and terms of the field experiment and to collect the emails
of the participants for sending interventions (incentives) and information. All registered
participants were given a code and directions to install the Catch-my-Day app.
Participants could start tracking at any time, and the 8 weeks would start from the
first complete tracking day. To remain eligible for the CHF 100 incentive, participants
were informed that they needed to track at least half the time for the duration of the
study. Participants identified as not tracking for a certain number of consecutive days
were notified by email, with the aim of increasing the quality of the tracking data and
reducing the dropout rate. An initial minimum number of 2 days between reminders was
set but later increased to 4 days, to avoid burdening the participants. Participants who
did not generate tracking data on more than 12 days in the first 4 weeks were not allowed
to participate in the treatment phase and did not receive the CHF 100 incentive.
Users can view their daily travel patterns on their phone in the form of a logbook,
validate the travel mode and activity purpose or indicate if a stage or activity did not take
place. There are some user-interface differences between the iOS and Android versions,
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which are most noticeable in the validation interface. Figure B.1 presents the validation
interface of the app for the respective operating systems.
Figure B.1: Validation interface for iOS (left) and Android (right)
To assess the mode detection performance of the app, we assume that a mode has been
assigned correctly if (i) a stage has been validated but not corrected and (ii) the person
in question has made at least one correction during the course of the experiment.21
Table B.1 provides the accuracy rates using this assumption. There is small difference
in accuracy between iOS and Android, with iOS being on average slightly better (92.23%
vs 92.10%). The differences in accuracy are more observable at the categorical level.
The iOS performs better on car, local rail, regional rail, tram and walk. However, the
differences are only 1-3% in accuracy. Note that ‘Rail’ groups all rail modes together for
conciseness. It is also worth noting that while the accuracy of some individual rail modes
is quite low, the overall rail accuracy is very good.
21Among the participants that used the validation functionality (85.7%) functionality, 20.4% of
iPhone users and 44.1% of Android users did not make a single correction over the 8 weeks of the ex-
periment. Even with state-of-the-art accuracy rates, a perfect mode detection is highly unlikely. We
will therefore assume that these participants did not use or understand the validation interface cor-
rectly and and these participants are therefore removed from the following analysis on the mode de-
tection performance. The difference between the two operating systems also indicates that the iPhone
validation interface was much more intuitive.
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Local train 88.67% 90.18%





Table B.2: Confusion matrix of mode detection accuracy
Confirmed mode
Airplane Bicycle Boat Bus Car Rail Tram Walk Other Total
Predicted
Airplane 2,113 - - - 22 - - - - 2,135
Bicycle 4 26,201 136 438 1,499 177 149 2,771 1,500 32,875
Bus 1 435 2 35,713 15,085 140 280 889 865 53,410
Car 372 2,495 741 8,028 366,649 3,314 1,950 2,834 7,433 393,816
Rail 64 56 85 1,748 7,298 60,270 691 258 298 70,768
Tram - 49 2 128 396 60 20,174 149 16 20,974
Walk 80 3,807 456 1,224 9,960 868 868 514,944 638 532,845
2,634 33,043 1,422 47,279 400,909 64,829 24,112 521,845 10,750 1,106,823
Table B.2 presents the confusion matrix between the modes. Here we can see that
the algorithm often mis-detected car travel as bus travel. The category ‘Other *’ includes
those modes which could be manually selected by the participant, but which were not
automatically detected. These included Carsharing, Taxi/Uber, Motorbike/Mopeds, and
Gondolas. Most of these were detected as car travel, and the 1,500 ‘Bicycle’ trips which
were corrected to ‘Other’ were predominately trips by motorbike or moped.
B.5 Final survey
Upon completing the tracking study, participants received an email with a link to the
final survey. The final survey contained questions related to the following topics:
• Socio-economic background: self-reported absences during the field experiment.
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• Employment background: same questions as in introduction survey to check changes
during the experiment and flexibility in working conditions regarding home office
and work schedule.
• Transport-related opinions
• Awareness and evaluation of the interventions
• Opinion regarding the use of the revenues of mobility pricing
• Lifestyles and values
• Bank data for the payment
B.6 Compensation
All participants who completed the final survey received CHF 100 for their full participa-
tion, except those who did not generate tracking data on more than 12 days during the
treatment phase, who instead received CHF 50 for partial participation (this partial com-
pensation was not discussed ex-ante). Participants who did not generate enough tracking
data in the observation phase were removed from the study, and thus did not receive any
compensation. In addition, participants in the pricing group received any positive amount
remaining on their virtual mobility budget.
Importantly, all participants were informed about the incentive of CHF 100 upon
completion of the study. The possibility of a partial incentive was not mentioned and
introduced at the end mainly as a gesture of appreciation towards people that delivered
some tracks (but not enough to be included in the study). Likewise, the possibility of
earning money during the pricing treatment was only communicated to the pricing group,
and only on day 29 of participation.
A form was provided at the end of the final survey in which the participants could
enter their bank account details, and all payments were processed by the ETH finance
department. Table B.3 shows a summary of the allocated virtual budgets, remaining
balances paid out to the participants as well as the incurred costs. Only the 1,147 par-
ticipants who completed the pricing treatment and received compensation are included.
Remaining balances (i.e., exhausted budget) are capped to zero, as this is the amount
that was actually paid out. This was the case for 202 participants.
64
Table B.3: Virtual budgets, remaining balances and incurred costs (CHF).
Virtual budget Remaining balance Incurred costs
Mean 173.82 45.45 132.89
Std. dev. 101.63 48.53 81.66
Min 50.00 0.00 0.00
25% 100.00 7.00 75.72
50% 150.00 31.44 115.37
75% 230.00 68.53 172.72
Max 745.00 432.68 616.08
B.7 Study monitoring and user support
Two dashboards were developed for the monitoring of both the participants and the
participation rate (see Figures B.2 and B.3 respectively). The first dashboard was essential
for troubleshooting with participants, as it gave a visual overview of their participation by
week, including when they track abroad. The second gave an overall view of the response
rate. This helped identify that a second invitation wave was required to meet the target
number of participants.
A project website was created to support people invited to the MOBIS study. The
website contained links to the introduction survey and the tracking study registration, a
project description, information for study participants (including a general information
sheet, instructions for the tracking app, data privacy policy and consent) as well an FAQ
section. The website was available in English, German and French.
Additionally, a help-desk service was set up to allow participants to ask questions and
communicate any issues they might have had during the study. The communication with
the help-desk was possible via phone call or email. The phone help-desk was open 10
hours per week, from 17:00 to 19:00 from Monday to Friday and from 10:00 to 12:00 on
Saturday. The online help-desk received 5,218 emails during the study, of which nearly
50% came during the on-boarding process.
B.8 Participant retention
To explore the retention rate of participants in the tracking phase, we performed a survival
analysis on the duration of tracking in the study. First, a Kaplan-Meier approach (see
Figure B.4) shows the impact of the treatment on the length of time which participants
would track. Participants who were automatically dropped out after phase 1 due to poor
tracking compliance but were still tracking at the end of phase 1 were censored (marked
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Figure B.2: Overview page of participants
Note: This screenshot was taken after the conclusion of the study, and the participants
counts do not reflect the real status during the study.
Figure B.3: Screenshot of the MOBIS response rates dashboard
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by a cross). There is no significant difference between the three treatment groups in
their survival curves. A sharp decrease in survival is evident in the last study week. As
participants were informed at the end of the study that they could delete the app, the
last few days of tracking were sometimes not collected before the app was deleted.
Figure B.4: Kaplan-Meier survival curve by treatment group
































Note: The cross indicates censoring of participants.
Given the participation goal of 8 weeks, one would expect that the attrition rate would
be highest early on in the study and flatten out as participants neared the 8-week goal,
after which they would receive the incentive. However, the survival curve is almost linear.
Furthermore, Figure B.4) shows that the treatment didn’t affect the attrition rate in the
second phase.
A time-variant Cox proportional hazards model is to investigate the impact of different
factors on the participation duration (see Table B.4 for the model results). To account for
time-dependent effects, the study period was stratified into fortnightly windows. Those
in high-income brackets (more than 12,000 CHF/year) were more likely to stop tracking.
Conversely, those from larger households and those with tertiary education were more
likely to track for longer. A significant gender-based difference was only observed in the
final fortnight, where females were more likely to remain in the study.
Contrary to expectations, there was no significant effect of age on the hazard rate.
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This suggests that common concern about the feasibility of tracking studies for older age
groups is unfounded, at least up to the age of 65, the age limit in this study.
The coefficient on employment is also time-dependent. Those in the workforce (i.e.
excluding students, homeworkers and retirees) were more likely to remain in the study
throughout the first fortnight.
The participant’s mobile device played a much larger role. Having an Android phone
of any model increased the hazard drastically. However, this effect was strongest in the
first week. The effects were even larger for Huawei models. The incompatibility of GPS
loggers with Android (and particularly Huawei devices) is already well known; however,
here the effect is quantified, and seen to be dramatic. The effect was also time-dependent,
with the most significant hazard in the first fortnight. At the end of the second fortnight,
participants who tracked insufficiently were removed from the study - this explains the
reduction in the Android hazard coefficient for the third fortnight, when many of them
could have been expected to stop tracking, had they not been removed from the study.
At the end of the tracking study, participants were told that they could delete the
app, but were also encouraged to continue using it if they wished. Figure B.5 shows the
dropout rate for the whole study, including the post-study period. The majority of the
participants dropped out soon after the study, but even 6 months after the study was
completed, around 5% of participants continued to use the app. Anecdotal reports from
participants indicated that they enjoyed having an overview of their travel, and that it
even continued to inform their mobility decisions. The impacts of the mobile operating
system continued even after the study, with the post-study retention rate falling faster
for Android users.
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Figure B.5: Post-study participation survival curve
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Table B.4: Cox porportional-hazard model
Beta (SE) HR (95% CI) p
Income > 12,000 CHF 0.28 (0.09) 1.32 (1.10, 1.58) 0.003 **
Household size -0.07 (0.03) 0.93 (0.87, 1.00) 0.038 *
Age (decades) 0.00 (0.03) 1.00 (0.95, 1.06) 0.883
Tertiary education -0.19 (0.08) 0.83 (0.70, 0.97) 0.022 *
German speaking 0.03 (0.09) 1.03 (0.87, 1.22) 0.752
Female
fortnight=1 0.02 (0.15) 1.02 (0.77, 1.35) 0.895
fortnight=2 -0.07 (0.20) 0.93 (0.62, 1.39) 0.721
fortnight=3 -0.04 (0.22) 0.96 (0.62, 1.48) 0.841
fortnight=4 -0.28 (0.12) 0.76 (0.60, 0.96) 0.022 *
Android
fortnight=1 0.87 (0.16) 2.38 (1.73, 3.26) 0.000 ***
fortnight=2 0.46 (0.22) 1.58 (1.02, 2.45) 0.040 *
fortnight=3 -0.01 (0.25) 0.99 (0.60, 1.62) 0.960
fortnight=4 0.41 (0.13) 1.51 (1.17, 1.94) 0.002 **
Huawei
fortnight=1 0.38 (0.20) 1.47 (0.99, 2.18) 0.057 .
fortnight=2 0.37 (0.32) 1.45 (0.78, 2.70) 0.239
fortnight=3 0.29 (0.41) 1.33 (0.59, 2.98) 0.487
fortnight=4 0.15 (0.21) 1.16 (0.77, 1.75) 0.465
Employed
fortnight=1 -0.33 (0.16) 0.72 (0.53, 0.97) 0.033 *
fortnight=2 -0.07 (0.23) 0.94 (0.60, 1.47) 0.775
fortnight=3 0.24 (0.27) 1.27 (0.75, 2.15) 0.369





Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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